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Abstract 
 
All development initiatives comprise a communications component, whether a public 
notice in the local newspaper, community meetings or a mass media public awareness 
campaign. But communication within development involves more than simply 
informing recipient populations of initiatives, events and targets. Communication is 
central to eliciting buy-in and creating a sense of community ownership; it is integral 
to maintaining public trust through the transparency and accountability it encourages; 
and, most importantly, it allows target populations to have their say in development 
initiatives that impact on their lives.  
Different countries, cultures and socio-political conditions will suit different 
communication types. Determining factors include, literacy rates, geographic 
distance, telecommunications infrastructure, religion, culture and politics.  
This thesis examines the communication strategies deployed by NGOs working in the 
Kingdom of Tonga. These strategies are analysed in the context of wider political, 
cultural and mass media conditions, with particular reference to the state of Tonga’s 
news media.  
In-country research for this thesis was conducted at the culmination of a tumultuous 
period for the Pacific’s only Constitutional Monarchy. Tonga has experienced rapid 
socio-political changes in recent decades with an increasingly dependent economy, 
growing challenges to traditional institutions and the crowning of a new King in 2006. 
In November 2010, the nation elected the first Parliament in 135 years to give 
commoners, rather than nobles, the majority in the Legislative Assembly. The 
General Election was conducted under an amended constitution, and was the first 
since riots destroyed much of the capital of Nuku’alofa four years earlier.  
With these events as a backdrop, this research asks what forms of communication 
work best in Tonga? Are these as effective on the relatively developed main island of 
Tongatapu as remote, outer islands? And what role does mainstream media play in 
keeping the population informed of development issues?  
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Preface 
 
As all researchers will be aware, our discoveries and conclusions are inevitably 
coloured by our own backgrounds. Prior to embarking on this thesis I had been a 
journalist for 15 years, working as a reporter, sub-editor and editor, both in New 
Zealand and overseas. When I returned to study in 2009 and began thinking about a 
thesis proposal, I hoped to somehow marry my work experience in journalism with 
Development Studies and looked for where the two might converge. The most 
obvious, it seemed, was in the promotion and maintenance of good governance.  
Poor governance – corruption, political instability, violence, absence of the rule of 
law and ineffective government among others – undercuts even the best-planned and 
executed development interventions. Good governance therefore rates alongside other 
fundamental development issues, such as gender, funding, sustainability and so on. In 
fact, governance features prominently in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(OECD, 2005), and is Goal 8a of the Millennium Development Goals 2000 (UNDP, 
2000). Goal 8a describes good governance as a key objective in establishing a fair, 
rule-based global financial and trading system.  
The news media has a central role to play in promoting good governance by shining a 
light on corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, violence, negligence and plain 
ineptitude.  
“The power of the media in a democracy comes from it being the ‘watchdog’ 
of society, the ‘fourth estate’, supplementing the other three pillars of 
democracy – the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary – by providing 
the necessary checks and balances on issues that concern the masses” (Saeed, 
2009). 
But what happens when the news media is not free and independent? How do people 
get information when government, powerful business interests, or their own culture 
act muzzle journalists and editors? I had experienced just such a stifled media first 
hand. From 1999 to 2001, I worked as a sub-editor for Viet Nam’s English language 
daily, Viet Nam News. Each night we expatriate employees witnessed the newspaper’s 
copy go to censors at the Ministry of Information and Communications before finally 
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being passed on to the printers. This heavy interference made us realise how valuable 
and central a free press is to a society that hopes to keep abuses of power in check.  
Of course communist governments have no monopoly on censorship: I saw similarly 
sanitised newspapers in the constitutional monarchy of Dubai. The newspaper format 
there was almost identical to Viet Nam News: daily front-page photo stories of visiting 
Emirs espousing lifelong fraternal devotion to their Dubai opposites. The plight of 
South Asian guest workers who daily died from heat exhaustion while working on 
building sites never made the news pages.  
Neither nation scores well in international press freedom ratings. The UAE, to which 
Dubai belongs, and Viet Nam are both rated ‘Not Free’ by Washington-based NGO 
Freedom House (Freedom of the Press 2010 Global Rankings). Meanwhile, Reporters 
Without Borders relegated the UAE to 87th in its 2010 ranking of 178 nations for 
global press freedom. Viet Nam climbed to 165th in its ranking, but was still among 
the 15 least free nations in the world (Reporters Without Borders, 2010).   
What interested me most was the knowledge that censorship and other media controls 
can never completely control the flow of information within a country. I saw this in 
2001 as discontent over official corruption and forced internal migration sparked a 
violent uprising among ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands of Viet Nam. 
Protesters attacked police stations and killed party officials. The government 
responded by closing Central Highland provinces and airlifting in over a thousand 
troops aboard commandeered Viet Nam Airlines passenger jets. None of this was 
reported officially, but it seemed all of Viet Nam knew about the reaction within 
hours. This information came to us by word of mouth. There were wild rumours too, 
but on the whole the information was accurate and timely.  
News media in the Pacific region is often less than completely free. Fiji is the obvious 
example, where coup authorities arrest and intimidate journalists, as well as strictly 
censor the news media (Amnesty International Fiji report 2009). In another 
constitutional monarchy, this time in the Pacific, Tonga’s first independent 
newspaper, Taimi ’o Tonga, was banned in 2003 under the Media Operators Act 
2003, Newspaper Act 2003 and Act of Constitution of Tonga (Amendment) Act 2003. 
This concerted effort by Parliament to control the news media was later overturned by 
Tonga’s Supreme Court. But as Kalafi Moala, editor and owner of Taimi ’o Tonga, 
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later explained, such draconian attacks are rarely needed in most Pacific Island 
nations:  
“At the end of the 1980s, the state and church institutions predominately 
owned media in Tonga. For many years, the government was the only 
institution that had money to operate its own newspaper, radio, and even 
television. 
“In a position of domination, island governments [my emphasis] often use 
the media they own to cover up their mistakes, misinform the public in regard 
to state intentions and policies, and effectively quash any attempt to bring 
them to accountability” (quoted by Papoutsaki and Harris, 2008. p176). 
I wanted to find out how communities find and pass on information where the news 
media is prevented from doing so. How do popular movements, such as the one that 
led to an uprising in Viet Nam or Tonga’s democracy movement, communicate and 
gain popular traction? I hoped to document these alternative information conduits so 
they might also be employed by development agencies to communicate their aims.  
Tonga seemed the perfect case study for my thesis. Not only did the literature confirm 
Tonga had a tightly controlled mainstream news media, it also provided:  
• a dense urban population on the main island of Tongatapu with isolated rural 
populations on outer islands 
• the predictability of a single news event – the November 2010 election – that 
would allow me to easily track news and analyse how Tongans got their 
information 
• 98 per cent literacy and high level of English spoken 
• direct relevance to New Zealand’s aid priorities. 
A preliminary trip to Tonga in May 2010 taught me my first thesis lesson – don’t 
believe everything you read. Much had changed since Taimi ’o Tonga had been 
banned in 2003. In seven years, independent print media had blossomed with at least 
four weekly newspapers and a news website all operating out of the capital. 
Television had grown from one state-controlled, black and white channel to multi-
channel satellite, as well as private terrestrial broadcasters. Radio had also flourished 
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with independently owned commercial FM stations broadcasting on Tongatapu and 
beyond.  
That is not to say Tonga had become a journalist’s paradise of openness and free-
flowing official information. There remains no freedom of information legislation 
(nor within any Pacific nation) (Rodrigues, 2008), ministries and Parliament remain 
parsimonious with public information and the government still talks about reigning in 
the news media (Pacific.Scoop, 2010).  
It became clear that my original thesis question was not supported by Tonga’s 2010 
media reality. What did reveal itself, however, was that information on development 
projects within Tonga was often patchy if not completely non-existent. It remains the 
case that many projects (not only in Tonga, but around the world) are merely 
presented to communities by donors and government as a fait accompli. There is little 
or no consultation or opportunity for local input (Flore-Smereczniak, 2008). 
Development projects are not well reported or communicated to the population, as 
Kalafi Moala explained during a 2010 interview for this thesis. He partly blamed this 
on the Ministry of Information failing to do its job, but also said that NGOs had 
become too closely linked to institutions, and had forgotten the fundamental tenets of 
Tongan culture – family, extended community and village. This sentiment was echoed 
by many of the news editors I interviewed during that first May 2010 visit to Tonga, 
and by Rodrigues (2008).  
These complaints led to my discovery of a rich vein of development discourse – 
development communication. This field of research is not only concerned with the 
role of journalism or the news media in development, but the whole process of 
communication as it relates to development. This then would form the basis of my 
thesis Getting the Message: Development Communication Strategies in the Kingdom 
of Tonga. 
 
 
 
Ken Lewis  
Wellington, 2011. 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
“I have consistently preached the gospel, which I expounded at the 1972 South 
Pacific Editor’s Conference, that if government by the people for the people is 
to mean anything more than a catch-phrase then the people concerned must be 
fully informed. That is the only way in which they can make intelligent 
judgements” (Usher, 1976).  
Sir Len Usher, a former editor of the Fiji Times, made the above statement during a 
Communication in the Pacific Conference held at the East West Center in Honolulu in 
1975. While Usher was speaking about his own role as a newspaper editor, his 
declaration can just as easily be applied beyond journalism to society in general and 
to the development industry in particular. To make “intelligent judgements” requires 
people first to be fully informed, and that requires effective communication.  
Communication has always played a part in development efforts, as  
Inagaki (2007) states: 
“Throughout the trajectory of international assistance practices in the last 60 
years, communication has always played important roles, albeit mostly in the 
background” (p 46).  
This particular form of interaction has been dubbed by development and 
communication scholars to be ‘development communication’, ‘participatory 
communication’ and ‘communication for social change’ to name a few.1 But whatever 
the term, the key aims of this form of dialogue is to mobilise support, create 
awareness, foster norms, encourage behaviour change, influence policy makers, and 
shift frames-of-reference for social issues (Wilkins and Mody, 2001).  
Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2009) states it even more strongly:  
“Communication for social change is about people taking into their own hands 
the communication processes that will allow them to make their voices heard, 
to establish horizontal dialogues with planners and development specialists, to 
                                                
1 Development-related communication practices will herein be termed development communication.  
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take decisions on the development issues that affect their lives, to ultimately 
achieve social changes for the benefit of their community” (p 453). 
As stated in the Preface, several newspaper editors in the Kingdom of Tonga 
interviewed for this thesis complained about the lack of information available on 
development issues and projects. This lack of transparency speaks to wider issues of 
governance – or rather a lack of ‘good governance’. The World Bank’s Kaufmann-
Kraay-Mastruzzi Worldwide Governance Indicators uses six dimensions to measure 
good governance. They are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control 
of Corruption (World Bank).  
In recent decades, Tonga has fallen somewhat short in several of these criteria. It has 
suffered a succession of scandals over financial mismanagement, nepotism and 
corruption involving government ministers and senior civil servants, as well as the 
nobility and royal family. The government has in the past attempted to silence the 
nation’s nascent independent news media, which had been highlighting these failures, 
and it had procrastinated over popular demands for greater democracy. This 
intransigence was a primary cause of the violent and devastating 2006 riots in the 
capital, Nuku‘alofa (Campbell, 2008). While the government has since backed away 
from controlling the media and has moved to steadily towards greater democracy 
culminating in the November 2010 General Election, it seems information on 
development issues has remained relatively inaccessible.  
This raises important questions for development in Tonga, and in general: Without the 
mainstream media reporting and informing populations on development initiatives, 
how do agencies communicate their plans and goals to target populations? How do 
they evaluate needs, select communities and initiate contact? And importantly, how 
do they create a sense of ownership of development initiatives within communities in 
order to achieve sustainable results?  
 
Research Aim 
The aim of this thesis is to find out how local development agencies communicate 
with target populations. The intention is to uncover and highlight communication 
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strategies proven to be effective on the ground so that these might be used by 
development agencies wishing to work in the Kingdom of Tonga.  
 
Research objectives 
To achieve that aim, the thesis will be guided by the following objectives: 
1. To research and understand the history, trends and current discourse on 
development communication and identify its key themes  
2. To understand the history of Tonga in relation to its political landscape, 
especially issues that led to the calls for democracy and the historic November 
2010 election under an amended constitution 
3. To understand the background to, and provide a snapshot of, the contemporary 
mainstream media landscape in Tonga 
4. Establish what communication strategies are used by NGOs in Tonga and 
ascertain which are the most effective and why 
 
Chapter outline 
Chapter Two discusses the methodology used to gather information for this research 
and considers wider ethical implications and constraints encountered in  
the field. 
Chapter Three addresses objective 1 by providing an overview of academic literature 
concerned with development communication, outlining the main debates and 
highlighting how these have impacted on development initiatives. 
Chapter Four charts the political and mass media landscapes of Tonga as specified in 
objective 2. This will provide context to the activities of local NGOs and the 
communication strategies they have adopted. 
Chapter Five backgrounds the NGOs studied in Tonga, detailing their aims and target 
audiences. 
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Chapter Six analyses the results of the research identifying communication strategies 
that are used, are effective and relating these to the themes identified by 
objective 1.  
Chapter Seven concludes by reiterating the main findings and detailing four main 
conclusions to be drawn from the research.  
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Chapter two: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief explanation of how this topic was chosen and how this 
research fits with wider development issues and within development communication 
in particular. It then outlines the design of the research and explains why a qualitative 
method was selected. Some of the challenges of making contact with the main 
participants are then detailed and an explanation is provided of how these were 
overcome. The chapter concludes by detailing some of the ethical constraints 
encountered.  
 
Media, Tonga, communication 
As stated in the Preface to this thesis, my original intention was to research the 
mechanisms through which populations receive information on important issues – 
especially political ones – when the mainstream media is tightly controlled. This 
proposal was based on an assumption about levels of media censorship and control, 
subsequently discovered to be false. While the country’s news media certainly had 
been under strenuous attack by the government in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
situation by 2010 was very different. Rather than a news media cowed by oppressive 
regulation, a vibrant, plural and free media was instead the reality.  
Fortunately, another more compelling research idea evolved based on comments 
made by Tongan journalist, editor and media owner Kalafi Moala (interview 2010). 
He stated that information and reporting on development activities within the country 
was almost non-existent and that few Tongans knew what development agencies or 
the government were doing for them in the name of development. He blamed the 
Ministry of Information and Communications for this, but also the development 
agencies themselves. He described these as being too closely linked to institutions, 
and decried them for forgetting fundamental tenets of Tongan culture – family, 
extended community and village. 
This lack of information on development initiatives has several potential pitfalls for 
development agencies. It means that the government, donors and NGOs are less 
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accountable for their rationalisation, financing and outcomes of development projects. 
This lack of information cuts local populations out of the decision-making process on 
matters that directly impact on their lives. This is not only undemocratic, it also 
undermines efforts to engender transparency and, in turn, local ownership – both key 
aims of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005) to which Tonga  
is a signatory. 
Transparency and ownership are internationally agreed development goals that are 
underpinned by effective communication strategies. These strategies keep 
stakeholders informed throughout the life of a project. Importantly, effective 
communication also enables citizens to become involved and to take ownership of an 
intervention. Clarke (2009) dubbed this community involvement ‘active citizenship’ 
and said it was a prerequisite for all participatory development interventions.  
With these overarching issues in mind, this thesis will look at what communication 
strategies NGOs and government agencies deployed in Tonga. The intention is to 
discover how they inform local populations about development activities and to assess 
how effective these communication strategies are.  
 
Epistemology  
An underlying assumption of this thesis is that all research is subjective. As opposed 
to positivist, analytical and humanistic approaches I contend that a researcher cannot 
be an objective recorder and observer neutrally carrying out study (Kitchin and Tate, 
2000). Instead, knowledge is ‘situated’ or as expressed by Susan Hanson (1992): 
“Knowledge is contingent on beliefs and values” (cited by Kitchin and Tate,  
2000: p 24).  
I came to my research with preset ideas, ideology, experience and interests. My 
choice of topic was a conscious reflection of this: as a former journalist, I decided to 
take the skills and knowledge I had built up in that profession and apply them to the 
realm of development studies. To that end, the knowledge I present in this thesis is 
‘constructed’ and is a reflection of my own ‘context’ as a former journalist. It is 
inescapable that my context also includes more fundamental characteristics; namely 
being middle-aged, male and pakeha. These realities also influence the construction of 
this thesis – not only how the information is interpreted and presented, but how it was 
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gathered. In the Tongan context, I was always going to be perceived as an outsider. 
This undoubtedly influenced what information interviewees provided. This need not 
always be a handicap: being a stranger may mean topics considered taboo within a 
culture can be discussed more easily with an outsider. 
The ultimate aim of this research is to apply its findings in the hope of affecting 
positive change in how development interventions are executed. The goal, therefore, 
is not a purely academic one intended only to increase the total of scientific and 
academic knowledge. Habermas would term this approach Critical Research (Kitchin 
and Tate, 2000), while Mikkelsen (2005) described it as ‘applied research’. She added 
that development studies research was primarily aimed at producing knowledge that 
would:  
“…initiate change at the national (macro) level, the regional or sector level 
(meso) and/ or the community or micro level. The need for information about 
the conditions and contexts in which interventions take place, about the 
modalities and processes of implementation, and the consequences and impact 
of interventions prompt most development studies” (p 125). 
 
Research method 
This research was a strictly qualitative investigation that used interviews as the 
primary source of original information. A literature review was also undertaken to 
provide background on the issues under study. Aside from being dictated by the type 
of methodological approaches used, the choice to use a qualitative research method 
reflected real-life constraints upon the thesis, such as limited time, limited finances, 
and a lack of usable secondary, quantitative sources of relevant information 
(Mikkelsen, 2005).  
A mix of methodological approaches was employed to investigate this thesis, 
although these fell under the general rubric of Historical-Hermeneutic science. 
Habermas (1978) coined this term when he divided science into three types: 
empirical-analytical, historical-hermeneutic and critical. Habermas created these 
delineations because there are different opinions on the purpose knowledge should 
serve.  
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“[Habermas] suggests that knowledge within each type is mediated through 
their own interests (technical, practical and emancipatory), developed within 
differing social media (work, language and power) and through different 
forms (material production, communication, and relations of domination and 
constraint)” (Kitchin and Tate, 2000: p 6). 
This research primarily used a phenomenological approach in an attempt to 
‘understand’, rather than ‘explain’ the world (Mikkelsen, 2005). This was achieved 
through in-depth interviews with individuals involved in the phenomena being 
studied, namely NGO and government staff, and recipients of development 
interventions. The research also had an element of the pragmatist school in that it tried 
to draw some conclusions about Tongan society through observation of individuals 
and communities.  
The type of interviews used were what Patton (1990) would term an Interview Guide 
approach (cited by Kitchin and Tate, 2000: p 213). That is, there were always some 
predetermined questions asked of interviewees, although the interview itself was 
conversational and ‘free-form’ in style. Mikkelsen (2005) would describe this as an 
interpretive study, or one concerned primarily with the life of the participants; how 
they interpret events and how this creates order in their lives. For this study then, it 
was just as important to interview the recipients of development projects as it was to 
interview experts and bureaucrats (ibid).  
 
Making contact 
Getting Tonga-based agencies to respond to emails or telephone calls from a complete 
stranger based in New Zealand proved extremely difficult, so I decided the next best 
approach was to go to Tonga and contact development agencies directly. My first 
interview in August 2010 was at the NZAID office where I met Melelua Langi at the 
New Zealand High Commission. She provided a list of NGOs (not all of which had 
worked directly with NZAID) and suggested other sources that might provide contact 
names, such as the AusAID representative in Tonga. I also met with Drew Havea 
from the Civil Society Forum of Tonga. At the same time I met long-time expatriate 
resident in Tonga, Mary McCoy. Both supplied me with names, as well as valuable 
background information on NGOs and development projects.  
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The dozen or so contacts I gathered that first day were the beginning of a ‘snowball’ 
research sample. This method of choosing study participants seemed the most 
effective for several reasons. One was the short time period I had – I was booked to 
leave Tonga within four weeks so had little time to draw up a more systematic 
sample. Secondly, given the relatively small number of development agencies 
operating in Tonga, I concluded that compiling a more systematic list would not 
provide a significantly different sample than through a snowball selection process. 
Thirdly, it seemed that adopting a stricter process of selecting interviewees would be 
at odds with a qualitative research method that relied on a largely unstructured 
interview approach and technique. Finally, during my first brief trip to Tonga in April 
2010, I found that citing a personal recommendation during introductions was the 
fastest way to gain trust and help interviewees feel at ease (e.g. “I was told by X at 
ABC NGO that you would be a good person to talk to.”) This is a reflection of Pacific 
oral culture and preference for face-to-face communication (Wrighton, 2010), and 
makes it an ideal location for snowball sample selection.   
There are risks associated with a snowball approach. Firstly, I was completely at the 
mercy of other people’s availability during my four-week timeframe. Secondly, there 
was always the possibility of sample bias, as I had no way of ensuring my initial 
contacts would refer me to people they personally supported or agreed with, skewing 
my entire sample. To mitigate that risk, I needed an initial contact who was less likely 
to promote his or her own agenda. That was the primary reason for approaching Drew 
Havea in his capacity as Chair of the board of directors for the Civil Society Forum of 
Tonga. On its website, the Forum states that it is:  
“… taking the lead role for involvement of Non Government Organisations on 
political, social, and economic activities that lead to sustainable development, 
economic growth and income generation” (Civil Society Forum of Tonga, 
2011). 
Its role is as an umbrella organisation representing all development agencies in 
Tonga. As such, I trusted that Drew Havea would provide me with contacts for 
development agencies with varied backgrounds and aims 
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Development agencies 
These contacts belonged to what would prove to be the key development agencies 
used in my research. Not least was MORDI Tonga, which both Havea and NZAID 
recommended. MORDI would become my primary case study, while other agencies, 
such as the Women and Children Crisis Centre, Tonga National Youth Congress, 
Tonga Community Development Trust and the Tonga Family Health Association 
became secondary case studies. I was also provided contacts of officials from within 
the Ministry of Finance and the Tonga Development Bank.  
Another source of contacts came from the office of Chief Justice Anthony Ford. Chief 
Justice Ford was my only acquaintance in Tonga and both he and his wife Valda 
proved extremely helpful in obtaining background information on development 
issues. This included providing contacts within the Community Development 
Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forestry and Fisheries, and the 
Langafonua organisation. 
As previously stated, the most important contact turned out to be MORDI Tonga. 
National programme co-ordinator Soane Patolo was immediately willing to help with 
my research and asked me to join the NGO in a visit to a remote island community in 
the Vava’u group. The plan was to observe MORDI training sessions on outboard 
motor maintenance in the community of Hunga, meet MORDI’s community 
facilitators and to stay with the community for three days to conduct my research. I 
would then return to Vava’u, where I could interview extension officers from the 
Tonga Community Development Trust. One of these, Alaipuke Esau, was on 
secondment from the Tonga National Youth Congress, so I could gain three NGO 
perspectives in remote island settings.  
Interviews 
For interviews, I initially explained who I was, where I was from and what I hoped to 
achieve by talking to each interviewee. I gave each subject a written description of the 
research with contact numbers, both in Tonga and New Zealand. Before or after the 
interview (whichever seemed more practical), I asked each interviewee to sign a 
consent form sanctioned by the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee. 
During interviews I asked prepared questions that definitely required answers, but 
otherwise let my discussions with NGO representatives and development recipients to 
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follow their own course. This allowed interviewees to raise issues they felt strongly 
about, taking the interviews in directions I had not anticipated and greatly enhancing 
the depth of information gathered. This open-ended and informal approach is very 
much akin to a discussion style that several Pacific cultures term talanoa.  
 
Talanoa  
According to a paper written by Sitiveni Halapua (2000), talanoa is a frank face-to-
face dialogue “without concealment”. The term is derived from tala, meaning talking 
or telling stories and noa, meaning ‘zero’ or ‘without concealment’:  
“Pacific island societies have throughout their histories relied upon the talanoa 
process. It helps build better understanding and cooperation within and across 
our human relationships” (p 1).   
For Donasiano Kalou Ruru (2010), talanoa is an informal and unstructured process:  
“It is subjective, mostly oral and collaborative, and is resistant to rigid 
institutional hegemonic control” (p 22).  
Journalism taught me that recorded interviews often create extra problems: equipment 
failure means entire interviews can be lost and recordings are also time-hungry – 
every hour of recording takes around three hours to transcribe into usable notes. This 
convinced me to primarily take notes in shorthand. My final interview with MORDI 
national programme co-ordinator Soane Patolo was recorded, however. By that stage, 
I already knew MORDI would be my primary case study so it was important not to 
miss any of Soane’s responses. I also knew that his rapid speaking style would likely 
outpace my note-taking skills.  
In all, I interviewed 26 individuals who are quoted in this thesis. Several others 
provided background, but are not directly quoted. I believe this represents a good 
spread of development actors in Tonga, including NGOs, government ministries, 
donor organisations and recipients.  
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Positionality 
As stated, I do not believe any of us can be completely objective: our social, political, 
cultural and gender experiences filter what we hear, see and feel. My own experience 
as a white, male, middle-aged, ex-journalist was always going to shape the way I 
perceived the research. Of course, experience can also be a positive. My experience as 
a journalist meant I was familiar with interviewing strangers from diverse 
backgrounds, and I was comfortable discussing complex topics while simultaneously 
taking notes and thinking of the next question to ask.  
There were also disadvantages that no amount of experience could mitigate. I did not 
speak Tongan, I was not related to anyone in Tonga (important in a family-centric 
culture), I didn’t look Tongan and I lacked local knowledge. Rightly or wrongly, I 
think most of those I met perceived me to be relatively wealthy. These could all be 
obstacles to free-flowing communication. But being so obviously a stranger can also 
have advantages: I could be forgiven by Tongans for asking about issues (politics, the 
monarchy and the Church) they may have been more reluctant to discuss openly 
among themselves and I was excused from some cultural demands (observing the 
Sabbath).  
My foreignness did not help me when it came to talking alone with women especially 
on the island of Hunga. While it was never stated directly, it was obvious that local 
custom forbade woman of marriageable age to be left alone with a male. On the one 
occasion that did happen by chance, the interviewee was distinctly uneasy. I cannot 
say whether this taboo prevented women speaking their minds freely, or whether it 
impacted the conclusions I have drawn. I acknowledge that this is one area that could 
be seen as a weakness in the research.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter briefly reiterated the origins of this research topic and placed it within 
the context of wider development discourse. It then detailed how and why a 
qualitative research methodology was selected and discussed some of the 
epistemological debates that underpin this approach. Practical issues that impacted 
upon information gathering were examined and explanations provided on how these 
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were addressed. Finally, the chapter addressed how the research may have been 
affected by ethical and positional constraints.  
The next chapter will take a detailed look at academic debates surrounding 
communication in development in order to place this research into a overarching, 
scholarly context. 
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Chapter three: Literature review 
 
Introduction 
This chapter identifies the three key theoretical threads of modernisation, diffusion 
and participation within the development communication discourse. It also draws 
attention to several associated communication strategies and debates that have 
relevance to conditions existing in Tonga. Finally, it identifies some gaps in the 
current theoretical debate.  
 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION 
The same economic, socio-political and cultural forces that have buffeted the 
development world over the past 70 years have also shaped the progress of 
development communication. During the confidence of the post-World War Two era, 
communication methods mirrored the modernisation approach of the First World 
instructing the Third on the correct path to progress. In the 1960s and 70s, 
communication practitioners liken many others in development began questioning the 
assumptions of modernisation and their use of mass media to ‘inject’ modernising 
attitudes into compliant and defenceless Third World populations. The post-war 
consensus was further shattered by divisions caused by the neo-liberal economic 
blitzkrieg of the 1980s and by the subsequent game-changing ramifications of 
globalisation in a post-Cold War world (Wilkins and Mody, 2001; Gumucio-Dagron 
and Tufte, 2006).  
Perhaps the most fundamental question to ask initially about development 
communication is how exactly it differs to the wider field of development? According 
to Wilkins and Mody (2001):  
“Broadly, development communication refers to a process of strategic 
intervention toward social change initiated by institutions and communities” 
(p 385). 
This is broad indeed, and there is not a lot in that definition to distinguish 
development communication from virtually any exercise that aims to transform 
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conditions within a community. Nancy Morris (2003) provides a more  
succinct description:  
“Communication is a key component of many overseas aid programmes. 
Efforts to improve living conditions in the world’s poorer areas through social 
service and infrastructure development are often accompanied by 
communication campaigns aimed at the general population” (p 225). 
Changing the situation of the world’s poorest is achieved (in part) through the 
strategic application of communication technologies and strategies. Communication 
tools, properly applied, can awaken awareness that mobilises support, encourages 
behaviour change, influences policy makers and even upends social frames of 
reference (Wilkins and Mody, 2001; Morris, 2003). Nor does communication need to 
be an add-on to other development drivers, such as the creation of infrastructure, 
capacity building or acquiring specialist expertise – communication can be the 
primary tool in a development project. This is particularly true of social marketing 
campaigns that advocate changes in behaviour or raise awareness of particular issues 
and are most often associated with health-related issues (Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte, 
2006). In the fight against HIV/AIDS for example:  
“… information campaigns are the only immunization possible until a vaccine 
is invented” (Wilkins and Mody, 2001: p 387). 
Whether it plays a central or very minor role, communication will form a part of all 
development projects. It may take the form of a well-resourced, multi-faceted and 
long-term strategy, or it may be a single public notice informing community members 
of their next development project meeting. Communication is ubiquitous, and can be 
the primary development tool, especially where behaviour change is the central aim.  
Despite this ubiquity, however, the dominant theories underpinning development 
communication are remarkably narrow, according to a World Bank study (Inagaki, 
2007). Inagaki names three dominant theoretical traditions starting with a 
communications approach that mirrored modernisation theory, This is followed by 
diffusion of innovations (popularised by Everett Rogers, 1962), which in turn led to 
the participatory approach as first expressed by Paulo Friere’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed published in 1968 in Portuguese, then in English in 1970.  
Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte (2006) have a slightly different assessment, contending 
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that just two threads dominate the past five decades of development communication. 
The first they agree is modernisation –communication models inspired by post-war 
modernisation theories. Within this they place diffusion, saying this is the mechanism 
by which the First World’s (so called) superior economic and technological 
knowledge could be transferred. Their second development communication thread is 
dependency. Just like wider dependency theory, the development communication 
version emerged from, and mirrored, Third World struggles against colonial and 
dictatorial powers. It too blamed poverty on structural factors rather than culture, and 
it too found a solution in a participatory approach.  
While Inagaki, Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte might disagree on details, they find 
themselves more or less in agreement. Other scholars cite further theoretical 
influences to the development communication canon including gender, cultural 
imperialism, globalisation, resistance, liberation theology and religion (Wilkins and 
Mody, 2001; Steeves, 2003; Wilkins, 2003; Waisbord, 2003; Huesca, 2001).  
Despite the pervasiveness that scholars argue for development communication, it is 
not blessed by corresponding level of support or understanding. This was not lost on 
Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2009):  
“Communication for development and social change has been around since the 
early 1970s; nevertheless and ironically, it is still considered a nuisance by 
many of the large development players – it makes them uncomfortable.  
Trying to explain communication for development and social change to decision 
makers involves simplifying some larger issues for them to understand the 
shorthand. However, even in very few words, we cannot disguise what this is 
about: communication for social change is about people taking into their own 
hands the communication processes that will allow them to make their voices 
heard, to establish horizontal dialogues with planners and development 
specialists, to take decisions on the development issues that affect their lives, to 
ultimately achieve social changes for the benefit of their community” (p 453). 
Gumucio-Dagron suggests it is the participatory quality of contemporary development 
communication and the grassroots empowerment this implies that makes some 
uncomfortable. Indeed, on a commonsense level, communication does imply a  
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two-way process between relative equals (at least within that communication forum). 
However, as communication theorists point out, this is far from always the case.  
 
MODERNISATION 
With the end of World War Two and the beginning of the Cold War, the 
modernisation paradigm was the dominant approach to tackling poverty and the 
incipient instability it promoted among the world’s poorest nations. The ‘Third 
World’ – a counterbalance to the ‘First World’ of capitalism and the ‘Second World’ 
of communism – had to be transformed from pre-modern ‘traditional’ states into 
modern, industrialised ones. This was the aim of both the First and Second worlds, 
although each aimed to create modern, industrialised states in their own  
ideological image.2  
The dominant modernisation blueprint came from the United States. It alone had 
emerged from the war unscathed and was eager to find markets for the consumer 
goods its undamaged factories were once again producing at breakneck speed. To this 
end, the US set about rebuilding war-ravaged Europe through the 1947 Marshall Plan. 
By 1952, and the end of Marshall Plan funding, the economy of every participating 
European state had surpassed pre-war levels; for all Marshall plan recipients, output 
in 1951 was 35 per cent higher than in 1938. While altruism was part of the Marshall 
Plan rationale, its chief aim was to counter the growing influence of the Soviet Union 
(Mody, 2000).   
Fears of growing communist influence were also held for nations emerging from 
colonial rule in Asia, Latin America and Africa. US President Harry Truman first 
publicly expressed a desire to extend a form of the Marshall Plan to these 
underdeveloped nations during his 1949 inaugural address:  
“We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas … The old imperialism – exploitation for 
                                                
2 Snyder (2003) relates how socialist nations independently ran massive mobilisation campaigns to 
promote everything from rat annihilation, behaviour changing and, of course, political ideology 
education. Scant literature is available on how the Second World intended to export its brand of 
poverty reduction and global influence. As a result, all references to communication development 
theoretical debates in this thesis relate to the First and Third Worlds.  
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foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of 
development based on the concept of democratic fair dealing” (Truman, 1949).  
Europe and the US shared many of the cultural, economic and political institutions 
that formed the foundations for modern, industrialised, consumer economies. But 
these institutions had either never existed in emerging Third World nations or had 
been systematically erased by their respective colonisers. For modernisers, therefore, 
the fight against poverty in the Third World also meant changing entire cultures. 
Modernisation is predicated upon the idea that societies progress through stages of 
development. This concept was crystallised in the First World by the Stages of 
Economic Growth model championed by Walt Rostow in his 1960 book The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. This model extols Enlightenment 
concepts of scientific rationality and individualism. It presupposes that economic 
growth and prosperity is achieved only by adopting a capitalist economic system with 
formal infrastructure and modern technology.  
“Implicit in the discourse of modernisation is a certain philosophy of what 
development in the Third World should be, and how it should be brought about” 
(Melkote and Steeves, 2001: p 71) 
Modernisation from a development communication perspective undertakes to change 
pre-modern and backward attitudes. This school of development communication 
relies on changing behaviour by deploying the ‘correct’ First World attitudes through 
mass media campaigns. A seminal theoretical attempt to rationalise this modernising 
communication approach was embodied by Daniel Lerner’s 1958 ‘passing of 
traditional society’ thesis (Inagaki, 2007; Mody, 2000). Lerner said that exposing 
people to the mass media allowed them to develop a sense of ‘empathy’ – the ability 
to envision and accept new ideas beyond one’s local conditions and traditions. It’s a 
top-down, one-way transfer of ideas, based on the notion that mass media messages 
directly impact on attitudes and behaviours (Inagaki, 2007). This approach had its 
genesis in World War Two propaganda drives and was popularised by US political 
scientist and communications specialist, Harold Lasswell. Strongly influenced by 
Freud, Lasswell took the view that humans were not rational and were driven by 
deep-seated emotions. This made them extremely susceptible to media messages in an 
industrialised and urbanised world. The Western way of life with its relentless 
promotion of individualism had atomised the influence of family, friends and 
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community. This created a passive population, largely defenceless against mass media 
messages. The effects of the mass media were seen as direct, powerful and uniform 
with information being shot direct into the popular consciousness.  This became 
variously known as the Bullet Theory, Hypodermic Needle Theory, or Stimulus-
Response Theory of mass media (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).  
The role of the mass media in development was accorded a central position in the 
modernisation paradigm (ibid), despite studies conducted during the 1940 US General 
Election that found mass media had little influence on people’s political decisions 
(Mody, 2000)3. Daniel Lerner, along with Wilbur Schramm, who wrote the highly 
influential 1964 book Mass Media and National Development, maintained that 
underdevelopment was often not caused by a lack of natural resources, but a lack of 
human capital. Mass media and education could play a pivotal role in building that 
capital. Their belief in the modernising power of mass media was strengthened by a 
high correlation between indices of modernity and the presence of mass media outlets. 
This was dubbed the mass media ‘haves and have nots’ and in 1961 UNESCO set a 
minimum standard for mass media availability in the Third World (Gumucio-Dagron 
and Tufte, 2009). This prescription held that every 100 people in a population should 
have access to 10 copies of a daily newspaper, five radio receivers, two cinema seats, 
and two televisions.4  
Melkote and Steeves (2001) point out the absurdity of this regimen: daily newspapers 
would likely take days at least to travel to rural areas where poverty is most prevalent, 
they point out, greatly diminishing whatever relevance the media may have. Weekly 
papers would be more practical, it is suggested. More realistic still, given that 
illiteracy is likely to be a problem, would be to prescribe more than the five radios per 
100 suggested by UNESCO. Even in 1961, cheap and portable transistor radios where 
well on the way to becoming the most popular communication device in history.  
                                                
3 Lazarsfeld and doctoral students from Colombia University studied the 1940 Roosevelt re-election 
campaign and found that radio and print media campaigns influenced the decisions of just 8% of 
voters. It was found that interpersonal communication had the greatest impact on behaviour, while 
media campaigns tended only to reinforce existing opinions.  
4 UNDP figures for mass media availability per 1000 people in developing countries in 1998 stipulated 
185 radios, 145 televisions, 39 main telephone lines, 3.6 cellular subscribers, 6.5 personal computers 
and 0.5 internet users. More recent UNDP figures are not available, however, according to a 2010 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat report into technological capacity, in 2008 Tonga had 25 fixed line 
telephone connections per 100 inhabitants and almost half its inhabitants had mobile phone 
subscriptions. In the same year, only about 8% of Tongans had internet connections and less than 1% 
had broadband connections.  
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The same could not be said of television, as even Wilbur Schramm pointed out in a 
1979 UNESCO report:  
“A good rule of thumb is that television costs about five times as much as radio. 
It requires more sophisticated technology, more highly trained technicians and 
maintenance men, producers and performers trained in some skills radio does 
not require. It is obvious therefore that radio is financially more acceptable for 
serving local audiences, easier for local communication teams to use effectively. 
And for this reason many developing nations have renewed their interest in 
radio, which many of them had abandoned in favour of television” (p 16). 
By the 1970s, First World policy-makers’ one-size-fits-all position was drawing 
increasingly scathing criticism, especially from Latin American dependency scholars. 
Certainly guilty of ethnocentrism, the architects of modernisation could also be 
accused of gross paternalism. Despite growing evidence that the mass media had only 
limited impacts on behaviour in the West, development practitioners happily recycled 
the theory of an all-powerful mass media manipulating defenceless receivers for 
decades in the Third World. This paternalistic outlook promoted other policies that 
were equally ill suited to their audience: Modernisation theory preached 
individualism, despite many Third World peoples being family and community 
oriented; it was essentially patriarchal and based on a Western concept of progress 
through historical stages, as articulated by Rostow (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).  
The optimism of the 1950s and 1960s that buoyed Modernisation Theory had all but 
evaporated with the oil shocks of the early 1970s. It was evident that little progress 
had been made combating poverty in the Third World over the preceding 20 years. By 
the mid-to-late 1970s, dependency theories and new communication models based on 
Brazilian educator Paulo Freire’s participatory approach had emerged as a viable 
alternative to modernisation. Dependency theorists, mostly based in Latin America, 
contended that First World concerns and experiences of the 1940s and 1960s had 
proved to be a completely inappropriate model for the complexities of the Third 
World, both for wider development issues and for development communication.  
“There is much value to the criticism made by dependency scholars that 
modernisation theorists refused to consider power, and specifically power 
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inequalities in the global scene, in understanding communication issues in 
Third World countries” (Waisbord, 2003, p 150-151) 
Melkote and Steeves (2001) further point out that First World communication 
strategies are developed for societies that are at peace, are prosperous and are stable. 
Rather than encourage change, these communication strategies promote conformity to 
the dominant paradigm: individualism over collectivism; competition over co-
operation; and economic efficiency and technology over cultural growth, social 
justice and spiritual advancement. They point out that the raison d'être of 
development communication, by contrast, is to change attitudes and behaviour. 
Another fundamental misapprehension was the actual media consumption patterns of 
Third World populations. Rather than eagerly consume development-oriented 
programming, many within target audiences preferred entertainment shows. And even 
when development themes formed a meaningful percentage of overall programming 
(there was evidence that programming schedules were increasingly being driven by 
commercial audience ratings), they often had little validity for poor rural audiences 
because those making the programmes were invariably urban elites with little 
conception of rural lives. In the most far-flung areas, development programmes may 
often not even be voiced in the local dialect (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).  
Another factor not addressed by Western communication models is control over 
communication devices at the receiving end, rather than the broadcast end. Everett 
Rogers cited an example of a village headman who owned the only radio in the 
community. His preference was for music rather than development programming 
meaning no one in his village heard development messages. Finally, there was 
evidence of a growing, rather than shrinking, knowledge gap. It was found that those 
with better literacy and existing knowledge gained more from development 
programming, leaving the less literate or educated even further behind. However, 
Mody and Shingi demonstrated in 1976 that by tailoring development programming 
to those most in need, knowledge gaps could be narrowed, if not erased (Melkote and 
Steeves, 2001). 
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DIFFUSION 
Diffusion shares many defining characteristics of the modernisation paradigm. It is 
essentially a paternalistic, top-down information exchange from First World ‘experts’ 
to Third World receivers. It equates development with the adoption of innovations – 
(generally) Western technology, political institutions and Western values. Where it 
departs from modernisation is it acknowledges that mass media campaigns have only 
a limited impact on behaviour. More importantly for development communication, 
diffusion recognises that interpersonal relationships are far more influential than mass 
media for the adoption of innovations (Inagaki 2007).  
Named for Everett Roger’s ‘diffusion of innovations’ theory (1963), the Diffusion 
Model dovetails neatly with modernisation theorists such as Lerner (1958) and 
Schramm (1964). At the beginning of his book Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers sets 
out the basic tenor of his thesis with a quote from Benjamin Franklin (1781): 
“To get the bad customs of a country changed and new ones, though better, 
introduced, it is necessary first to remove the prejudices of the people, enlighten 
their ignorance, and convince them that their interests will be promoted by the 
proposed changes; and this is not the work of a day” (p 1). 
While the Diffusion Model recognises the limits of mass media, it nonetheless regards 
behaviour change as the goal of any communication campaign. This is achieved by 
providing new ideas and information that persuade individuals to change their 
behaviour. The standard formulation of this model is Knowledge-Attitudes-Practice, 
or KAP. Information provides Knowledge, which leads to a change in Attitudes, 
which in turn leads to Practice – the desired behaviour change (Morris 2003).  
Rogers (1983):  
“Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through 
certain channels over time among the members of a social system. Diffusion is a 
special type of communication concerned with the spread of messages that are 
new ideas” (p 34). 
Investigations into diffusion predated Rogers’ 1963 volume and, rather than Third 
World development, it was primarily concerned with the adoption of ideas and 
technology in the industrialising West. The economic potential of this process became 
very clear with publication of a 1943 study by Ryan and Gross on the adoption of 
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hybrid corn in Iowa. Rogers called it one of the most influential diffusion studies of 
all time.  
In 1928, a hardier corn hybrid was introduced to Iowa farmers, heralding an 
agricultural revolution in farm productivity. By 1941, the corn had been almost 
universally adopted and, hoping to explain this rapid uptake, Ryan and Gross 
interviewed 259 Iowa farmers. Their study gave rise to a new field of study and the 
birth of new concepts and terminology that have since become part of common 
vernacular – ‘early adopters’, ‘laggards’, ‘communication channels’ to name a few. 
For communication specialists, the real relevance of diffusion is in revealing the 
mechanisms by which innovations are spread:  
“Given that an innovation exists, communication must take place if the 
innovation is to spread beyond its inventor” (Rogers, 1983: p 17).  
By the 1960s, it was realised that the diffusion model could be applied to 
socioeconomic development and there was an explosion of diffusion-based 
investigations in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Diffusion seemed a natural 
framework with which to evaluate the impact of development programmes in 
agriculture, family planning, public health and nutrition (Rogers 1983). At the time, 
the mass media was seen as the most efficient way of informing potential adopters 
about an innovation. This belief has changed little, according to Inagaki. In a 2007 
World Bank study he contends that despite its many critics, vertical information 
transmission is still a highly influential strategy in development projects, with 
numerous studies demonstrating that repeated exposure to mass media messages 
remains important in achieving direct impacts.  
 
Diffusion critics 
However, diffusion is not without its critics. They accuse the approach of having 
theoretical and methodological biases, and social-structural constraints. Criticisms 
centre on the implicit assumption that any kind of mass media exposure leads to 
development with little attention paid to the actual content, quality, appropriateness or 
reliability of the message. Studies of diffusion programmes seem concerned only with 
how, when or where someone heard a message, not what they thought of that message 
(Melkote and Steeves 2001). Another criticism is that diffusion has a pro-innovation 
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bias, or that all innovations are beneficial merely by virtue of being ‘innovative’. The 
folly of this has been proved repeatedly, but no more so than in agriculture where the 
introduction of Western-style single cash crops have been the ruin of many Third 
World farmers, who quickly found themselves reliant on foreign products, technology 
and markets. This has led to famine as markets collapse and development experts 
realise all too late there were sound reasons why farmers practiced mixed cropping or 
preferred certain plant varieties over others (ibid). This pro-innovation bias also posits 
that innovations only flow one way; that Third World farmers and nations have 
nothing to teach the First World, that the ‘West is best’. This conveniently ignores 
that Western technology was not created in a vacuum, that it is the accretion of 
successive innovations many of which originated in the Third World. This mindset 
encourages an attitude of the ‘source knows best’ and a closely related tendency to 
blame the receiver for their failure or poverty. 
Further, the very notion that receivers need to be ‘persuaded’ implies that those not 
persuaded must be recalcitrant. Again, this blames the audience for their 
underdevelopment and fails to consider other reasons, such as not hearing the 
message through a lack of resources, illiteracy, language and so on. Development 
communication projects often assume certain levels of literacy according to Melkote 
and Steeves (2001), with several studies showing projects presupposing that 
audiences have a knowledge of percentages, weights and measures, Western symbols, 
numeracy and so on. This particularly impacts upon women, who are often less 
literate but more involved in agriculture. These assumptions in turn widen knowledge 
gaps, exacerbating divides between a nation’s poorest and its internal elites.  
Diffusion adherents rely on a trickle-down of innovations from early adopters out to 
the majority and finally to laggards. In fact, early adopters are likely to already be the 
elite: they have the advantage of being on the ground-floor of new markets, they 
likely have resources they can gamble on innovations, and are just as inclined to 
withhold innovations from competitors as share them, thus widening the income gap.  
Finally, in the Third World, as in the West, extension agents5 have been widely used 
to promote innovations, especially agricultural ones. Generally in short supply, these 
                                                
5 Extension agents, or Roger’s ‘traditional change agents’, are usually government or NGO 
representatives charged with informing communities about innovations – most often agricultural or 
health related. They are often not from the area they work in, meaning they will not understand the 
local situation, and may not even be farmers or health professionals.   
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agents understandably target the ‘low-hanging fruit’ – community leaders, who are 
generally the best educated and wealthy. Even if these individuals feel inclined to 
pass innovations on to others, there is little hope that they will do so accurately – their 
message will always be second-hand and less clear for receivers (ibid). Despite these 
criticisms (many of which Rogers later addressed), diffusion theory still has an 
enormous influence on development communication (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009).  
The diffusion model can be seen as an intermediate step between the polar opposites 
of modernisation and participation. Like modernisation, diffusion espouses an 
essentially one-way transmission of information. But unlike its theoretical 
predecessor, it recognises that the ability of mass media to provoke behavioural 
changes is limited. More importantly for the participatory approach, diffusion 
theorists quite early on recognised the importance of interpersonal channels in the 
adoption of new ideas. It is the interpersonal channel that has since become the focus 
of many communication studies (Inagaki 2007), something Rogers himself 
foreshadowed in 1983:  
“On the other hand, interpersonal channels are more effective in persuading an 
individual to adopt a new idea, especially if the interpersonal channel links two 
or more individuals who are near-peers” (p 18). 
Interpersonal communication is now recognised as hugely important, especially 
within behaviour modification projects such as HIV/AIDS and family planning 
awareness campaigns. Several studies have shown that interpersonal communication 
– that is between spouses, among family, friends and neighbours – has greater 
influence on behaviour change than mass media campaigns, although mass media 
campaigns are a necessary precursor for sparking interpersonal communication 
(Inagaki 2007).   
 
Social marketing 
Social marketing, initially developed by Western advertising agencies, is also a 
widely used development communication tool and diffusion campaigns have 
increasingly been replaced by it. USAID and the World Bank have funded social 
marketing from as early as the 1970s (Snyder, 2003).  
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Mass media is an essential tool for social marketing, which Gumucio-Dagron and 
Tuft (2006) argue immediately makes it the preserve of large and powerful 
organisations able to bankroll television, radio, print and billboard campaigns. Having 
deep pockets also means other standard advertising tools used for social marketing, 
including consumer research and pre-testing through focus groups, targeting, audience 
segmentation and campaign evaluation, can be bankrolled (Morris, 2003; Snyder, 
2003).  
This dominance by the powerful also allows those organisations to frame social 
‘problems’ as they see them, as opposed to the recipients of innovations. Critics agree 
that while socially desirable goals might be the stated aim, in reality most social 
marketing campaigns promote a product, whether it be high-nutrition food, 
contraceptives or agricultural advances6 (Steeves, 2003; Melkote and Steeves, 2001). 
This marriage connects projects with the commercial sector, encouraging 
governments and NGOs to gradually commercialise development programmes. This 
focuses projects on economic goals at the expense of long-term interests, such as 
improving human rights or women’s status, argues Wilkins (2003):   
“As people become valued in terms of their ability to consume, programmes 
for the public good begin to neglect resource-poor and marginalised 
communities. Programmes designed to improve health, for example, become 
justified in terms of their benefits to the global economy, rather than in terms 
of human rights and dignity.  To legitimise this approach, programmes focus 
on local efforts and individual-level change so that political-economic 
structural concerns are not questioned” (p 248). 
According to Gumucio-Dagron and Tuft (2006), it is the health sector that has been 
the most fervent adopter of social marketing, especially among health sector 
organisations closely associated with the world’s most powerful – the G-8 nations. 
Today it is the AIDS pandemic that has seen social marketing deployed against it 
(with little success, they point out), but prior to that it was population control.  
Rather than tackle structural issues that contribute to these problems, such as no social 
security net for old age or high child mortality rates in the case of population control, 
                                                
6 One early example of a product being at the centre of a social marketing campaign was a drink 
promoted to remedy dehydration caused by diarrhoeal disease. Former advertising executive, Robert 
Manoff, was the creator of the Nicaraguan Superlimonada drink (Snyder, 2003). 
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social marketing campaigns concentrate on family planning. It is the individual that 
must control him or herself regardless of other factors encouraging large families. 
This is reminiscent of the modernisation conviction that culture and traditional beliefs 
are to blame for poverty.  
Gumucio-Dagron and Tuft (2006) contend that because social marketing campaigns 
are often created and run by advertising agencies, they ignore informal 
communication channels more salient to poorer sectors of the community, especially 
in rural areas. Instead, advertisers use hi-tech methods that: 
“… seek to ‘sell’ a version of harmony and happiness worldwide … Attractive 
messages, often featuring famous role models, use state-of-the-art technology to 
persuade rather than to educate” (ibid, p xvii).   
The results have sometimes been catastrophic, as the 1970s Nestlé7 promotion of 
infant formula to mothers in developing nations demonstrated. Rather than being the 
healthy alternative it was promoted as, infant formula was accused of killing babies 
because parents did not have access to clean water to mix the milk powder in or 
refrigeration to keep it fresh (Melkote and Steeves, 2001; Gumucio-Dagron and Tuft, 
2006).  
So it can be seen that while diffusion, and its fellow traveller social marketing, 
broadened the modernisation model, both still adhered to a fundamentally top-down 
approach that eschewed tackling structural economic problems, tending instead to 
blame the culture of the impoverished. But it was the participatory approach that truly 
unseated modernisation as the dominant development communication model (Morris 
2003). In fact, as early as 1976, diffusion’s principal architect, Everett Rogers, had 
acknowledged the power of participation. Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2009) quotes 
Rogers from a 2004 interview where he describes his own changing conception of 
development communication. This reassessment came after being asked in 1976 to 
edit articles by Latin American, Asian and African scholars in a special issue of the 
journal Communication Research.  
“The articles included empirical studies showing that development could 
happen in a variety of ways, including the importance of participatory 
                                                
7 A 1977 boycott in the US against the Swiss-based Nestlé corporation went global following 
magazine articles and a libel case brought by Nestlé highlighted the issue of infant deaths related to the 
use of infant formula in developing nations.  
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approaches. So I edited this special issue, which was later published as a small 
book by Sage Publications, and my initial chapter in it basically pointed out that 
the old model of development communication had passed or was passing, and 
there was evidence to support this thesis. My thinking was changing about the 
role of communication in development, as was my writing on the subject”  
(p 445) 
 
PARTICIPATION 
Participation has no final meaning, stated British academic and author Robert 
Chambers (2005). The author of Rural Development – Putting the Last First added 
that this vagueness was appropriate as each individual and group should puzzle out 
what they think it should mean and how to give it expression. An advocate of 
participation since its earliest incarnations, Chambers also noted that the participatory 
method of delivering development had become almost ubiquitous by the 1990s:  
“… it entered almost every field [of] development activity and became a 
preoccupation on a global scale, preached about and promoted by lenders, 
donors, INGOs and governments alike” (ibid, p 101).  
Indeed, Majid Rahnema called participation “a redeeming saint” for the development 
industry (cited by Leal, 2007). But this was no endorsement; Rahnema claimed that 
participatory approaches had been co-opted to gloss over development’s failures. 
Rather than examine the overarching structural causes of intractable poverty, blame 
was instead laid at the door of peripheral details – in this case, a paternalistic, top-
down modernisation approach practiced by development agencies.  
Gumucio-Dagron and Tuft (2006) have a somewhat different assessment. They claim 
that the once dependency theorists had identified structural problems as the cause of 
poverty, rather than ancestral and cultural defects, countless social and political 
actions emerged to address these issues. In parallel, alternative and participatory 
forms of communication evolved. These did not rely on existing communication 
models, but grew organically out of practice.  
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Participation and ownership 
Intrinsic to the participatory approach is the concept of power and closely related 
ideas of empowerment, partnership, accountability, ownership and active citizenship 
(Clarke, 2009; Chambers, 2005; Huesca, 2003; Gumucio-Dagron , 2009; Cornish and 
Dunn, 2009; Leal, 2007).  
Community participation and ownership of development processes and interventions 
presupposes a level of active citizenship, according to Clarke (2009), who added that 
achieving sustainable change is unlikely without first gaining active community 
involvement in an intervention (as opposed to passive acceptance). This involvement 
includes the community participating in needs analysis, project identification and 
design, implementation monitoring and evaluation. Other stakeholders (government 
authorities, for example) also need to feel they ‘own’ the intervention. This sense of 
ownership via participation is the logical and necessary outcome of active  
citizenship (ibid). 
The participatory development model, as first outlined in Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed (1970), stresses that dialogue is a catalyst for developing individual 
and community critical consciousness. This he called “conscientisation”. The 
Brazilian educationalist said that development should afford people greater control 
over the decisions that affect them while also fostering social equity and democratic 
practices (Morris, 2003; Cornish and Dunn, 2009). 
The participatory approach holds that dialogue cannot be a vertical process of 
information transmission from the ‘knowledgeable’ to the ‘less knowledgeable’, but 
rather a horizontal process of information exchange and interaction. It ‘empowers’ 
citizens to have greater control over their social, cultural, and political environment. 
Importantly, it also requires traditional ‘senders’, or those in power, to act as listeners 
and co-creators of agendas and development solutions alongside traditional 
‘receivers’ (Cornish and Dunn, 2009). Steeves (2003) stated that Freire’s assumptions 
of what development communication should do was radically different from the 
assumptions of modernisation:  
“Freire argues that once people named their sources of oppression, as well as 
their sources of power, they would then be able to find solutions. For 
development communication practice, the central focus should be face-to-face 
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egalitarian dialogue to initiate and sustain a collective process of reflection  
and action” (p 236) 
Another fervent advocate of the participatory model of development communication, 
Gumucio-Dagron (2009) stated that communication is the lifeblood of participatory 
development:  
“Participation in development programmes and projects cannot occur without 
communication for one simple reason: participation is communication, the 
concepts are entangled, intimately knotted as the strings in a fisherperson’s net” 
(p 460). 
Bessette (2006) goes even further:  
“The focus is not on information to be disseminated by experts to end-users. 
Rather, it is on horizontal communication processes that enable local 
communities to identify their development needs and the specific actions that 
could help to fulfil those needs, while establishing an ongoing dialogue with 
the other stakeholders involved (eg, extension workers, researchers and 
decision-makers). The main objective is to ensure that the end-users gather 
enough information and knowledge to carry out their own development 
initiatives, evaluate their actions and recognise the resulting benefits” (p 5).  
But what exactly constitutes participation? Since the 1970s, numerous development 
models have fallen under the ‘participatory’ rubric. Inagaki (2007) lists just some: 
Liberation Pedagogy (Freire, 1970); Putting the Last First (Chambers, 1983); 
Dialogue Paradigm (Guba, 1990); Multiplicity Paradigm (Servaes, 1991); 
Another Development (Melkote, 1991; Jacobson, 1994); Empowerment 
Approach (Friedmann, 1992); and Autonomous Development (Carmen, 1996).  
In his study of 12 projects identified as using a participatory method, Inagaki stated 
that Uphoff’s 1985 participation themes could be identified in all. Those are:  
1. Participation in decision making 
2. Participation in implementation 
3. Participation in evaluation 
4. Participation in receiving benefit.  
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Inagaki then lists very similar communication themes to those promoted within 
participatory initiatives:  
1. The participation of the intended beneficiaries in different or all of the 
project-cycle stages  
2. Horizontal dialogue rather than vertical information transmission  
3. Cultivation of trust and mutual understanding rather than persuasion  
4. Local-level actions rather than national-level programmes  
5. Local knowledge  
6. The role of development specialists as the facilitator and equal participants 
rather than decision-makers  
7. Communication process rather than specific outcomes  
8. The use of communication to articulate deep-seated social relations (p 7). 
Snyder (2003) declares that what counts as participation within campaigns can vary 
widely. However, she had also identified five common approaches: 
1. Representative participation where the support of local representatives is 
gained and they are included in advisory roles  
2. Local expert participation is where existing local organisations are used to 
conduct campaigns that may be created together, or locals are hired to help 
create campaigns 
3. Audience research participation requires intensive preliminary research with 
the target audience to refine targets, messages and so on  
4. Local outreach worker participation updates Rogers’ diffusion concept by 
using local communicators similar (homophilous8) to the target audience  
5. Government agenda-setting participation sets up direct communication links 
with government officials, such as allowing locals to influence decisions by 
sending video evidence of problems and proposed remedies directly officials 
(p 172). 
Snyder added that evidence suggests these approaches increase sustainability over 
time, especially where local organisations are strengthened. However, she also 
questioned whether participatory research necessarily empowers audiences:  
                                                
8 The term homophilous was coined by Rogers to denote individuals or groups whose interests, 
outlooks and backgrounds are so similar they easily trust each other and quickly share ideas.  
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“… conducting research with the target audience does not empower them, 
because the audience only has the power to make suggestions” (p 173).  
Snyder questioned the ability of a participatory project to enhance democracy. She 
asked: How many audience members need to be involved for it to be deemed 
participatory, let alone democratising, and to what level of authority within the 
decision-making process should participants reach before a project can be deemed 
truly participatory?   
Meanwhile, Bessette (2006) identified key ingredients for development 
communication. While his research is concerned specifically with natural resource 
management, his prescription echoes and underlines those raised above:  
“For communication to be effective in addressing the three interlinked 
development challenges of poverty alleviation, food security and environmental 
sustainability, it must fulfil the following functions: ensure true appropriation 
and ownership (not just the buy-in) by local communities of any Natural 
Resource Management research or development initiative; support the learning 
needed to realise the initiative and facilitate the circulation of relevant 
knowledge; facilitate the building of partnerships, linkages and synergies, with 
the different development actors working with the same communities; and 
influence policy and decision-making processes at all levels (family, 
community, local and national)” (p 29).  
Participatory components are now included in most contemporary development 
projects regardless of their theoretical orientation, although there is debate as to 
whether this is more for the sake of appearance than any genuine desire to empower 
and democratise communities. Likewise, the communication component of 
participatory development is at best contested and, at worst, misused and distorted 
(Huesca, 2003). Cornish and Dunn (2009) attempted to dispel the distortions by 
defining participatory communication as a process of sharing and expressing 
knowledge and information. Communication, on the other hand, means 
communicating between people. In their investigations, the pair traced the rise of the 
participatory approach to see how it informed development communication. They 
contend that as the participation model became the favoured tool to bring about social 
and political transformation, communication also embraced new forms, such as 
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comics, posters and simplified education materials. While more popular, these forms 
of communication essentially remained a vertical process of imparting information 
from experts to participants.  
With the rise of neo-liberal economic policies in the 1980s, the emphasis of 
development initiatives shifted to promoting self-reliance. A new prominence was 
given to interactions with donor bureaucracies as NGOs proliferated and theorists 
focused more on the role of civil society. Later in the 1990s, the rise of Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA), Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) and Participatory 
Action Research (PAR) methodologies saw communication become even more 
central to the development process and not just an output at the end (ibid).  
 
Participation’s critics 
Predictably, as participation and participatory communication practices have become 
de rigueur, criticisms of the approach have also multiplied. Some critics held that 
participatory projects assumed all communities were homogeneous and that they 
conveniently ignore the exclusion or under-representation of certain groups (Inagaki, 
2007). Other critics saw the rapid adoption of participation into the mainstream 
development ethos as a form of co-option – a direct reaction to critiques of 
modernisation.  
“For participation to become part of the dominant development practice, it first 
had to be modified, sanitised, and depoliticised. Once purged of all the 
threatening elements, participation could be re-engineered as an instrument that 
could play a role within the status quo, rather than one that defied it” (Leal, 
2007: p 543)  
This ‘mainstreaming’ of participation can be traced as far back as the 1970s with UN 
measures contributing to the adoption of participatory development. These include the 
1978 World Health Organisation Declaration of Alma Ata, which stated:  
“… the people have the right and duty to participate individually and 
collectively and in the planning and implementation of their health care” (cited 
by Morris, 2003).  
Participation’s final admission into the mainstream perhaps came with World Bank 
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President James P. Wolfensohn championing the cause when he stated that Third 
World countries need to design their own development policies instead of the 
financial system imposing programmes on them (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009). This 
thinking was embodied in the World Bank’s 2000 multi-country research initiative 
Voices of the Poor, which promoted the use of participatory methodologies in policy 
processes. These concepts also spread to participatory governance, accountability, and 
citizenship. That same year, Melkote and Steeves (2001) wrote:  
“Thus, people at the grass roots were co-opted in activities that, in the end, 
would make consumers of them for industrial goods and services. Participation, 
therefore, was a means to an end; the end being greater dependence of the 
people on a market controlled by elites, both national and international” (p 339). 
Promotion of participatory approaches by the very architects of modernisation and 
neo-liberal economic policies only increased charges that participation was being 
used to validate predetermined outcomes and even saw participation labelled the ‘new 
tyranny’9 (Cornish and Dunn, 2009). 
 
Participation as end or as means 
Debates that have formed around the participation model over the past four decades 
continue to be argued today. One is the ‘participation-as-end’ and ‘participation-as-
means’ dichotomy (ibid). Participation-as-end holds that participation is a 
fundamental right, with some proponents declaring it a basic human right and citing 
as support Article 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights that guarantees the right 
to communicate. Melkote and Steeves (2001) quote Juan Diaz-Bordenave to 
demonstrate this opinion: 
“The need to think, express oneself, belong to a group, be recognised as a 
person, be appreciated and respected and have some say in crucial decisions 
affecting one’s life are as essential to the development of an individual as 
eating, drinking and sleeping … Participation is not a fringe benefit that 
authorities may grant as a concession but every human being’s birthright that  
                                                
9 An early critique of participation, Participation: The New Tyranny (2001) compared participatory 
development's promises of empowerment and appropriate development with what actually happened 
on the ground and was edited by University of Manchester academics Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari. 
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no authority may deny or prevent” (p 337). 
Extending guarantees of free speech to participation puts participation-as-end 
advocates on a direct collision course with existing power elites who might turn a 
deaf ear to criticism of their positions, but are likely less willing to accede to direct 
popular participation in local, national or international affairs. 
Participation-as-means, on the other hand, is a more functional and pragmatic 
approach. It does not necessarily support empowerment, transparency and societal 
transformation as its principal goals; rather participation is a necessary, if not 
desirable, ingredient for successful development initiatives. Thus, it can be seen that 
the participation-as-end/ participation-as-mean dichotomy is a struggle between a 
strictly technical project aspiration and participation as a political force (Cornish and 
Dunn, 2009).  
Yet, participatory development and participatory communication are underpinned by 
an empowerment agenda. This encourages a dialogue that challenges power inequities 
in order to bring about social change from the bottom-up (ibid). Participatory 
communication envisages a fundamentally new approach to development, one that 
sees communication as the very objective of development efforts. It can also be a 
means of self-expression and self-management for self-development (Mody, 1991). 
By including the voices of the marginalised and underprivileged, communication 
processes can become more inclusive and open-ended, rather than goal-oriented, and 
may provide a venue to directly address structural problems. On a practical level, this 
may mean that gender inequality (for example) is tackled as part of a package of 
efforts to reduce HIV/AIDS, rather than simply focusing on  
discouraging unprotected sex (Inagaki, 2007). 
 
Participatory communication problems 
Tackling structural issues highlights one of the practical problems faced by 
participatory projects and participatory communication (particularly interventions 
applying a participation-as-end approach). These are necessarily long-range and time-
consuming types of interventions that often have quite symbolic objectives such as 
‘empowerment’. These rarely conform to the evaluative criteria demanded by 
development bureaucracies (Yoon, 1996; Inagaki, 2007).  
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Projects that are strongly participatory in nature may produce animosity with local 
government or community officials, as they often demand the transfer of decision-
making and power to beneficiaries. Simply not involving officials is not an option, 
because, as stated earlier, a central theme of participatory projects and participatory 
communication is to encourage the involvement of local representatives. Participatory 
projects can also generate divisions within communities: to illustrate this point 
Inagaki (2007) refers to tensions created between Peruvian villagers when the women 
demanded changes after listening to entertainment-education radio dramas promoting 
reproductive rights.  
Another criticism, albeit one shared by other development methods, is an assumed 
community homogeneity. This ignores the exclusion or under-representation of 
certain groups (such as women) that often exists within communities (ibid).  Finally, 
conceptual fuzziness around participation, including no agreed measure of 
participatory outcomes means oppressive social relationships can be reproduced under 
the guise of participation (Huesca, 2003; Morris, 2003).  
 
Liberation theology  
Liberation theology is most widely associated with the Catholic Church in Latin 
America and with figures such as Gustavo Gutiérrez and Paulo Friere. It was an 
attempt to address the poverty and injustice that oppressed the vast majority of Latin 
Americans, especially from the latter half of the twentieth century when oppressive 
dictatorships visited injustice not only upon rural poor, but upon a burgeoning urban 
middle classes far less inclined to suffer silently. While influenced by Marxism, 
liberation theology is also concerned by spiritual matters and sees liberation from 
oppression as a precursor to ultimate salvation.  
The relevance of liberation theology to this thesis is the huge influence the Church 
has within Tongan society. While Tonga’s conditions are considerably different from 
those experienced in Latin America and the island nation is predominantly Protestant, 
this does not preclude the Church from playing a role in social and political 
transformation. There are numerous examples outside Latin America where religion 
(and not only Catholicism) has been a key player in popular struggles for change. 
Iran, East Timor and Viet Nam (see Preface) are just a few. Given its role in Tongan 
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society, the Church would always be a worthy topic of consideration for this thesis.  
Freire is perhaps the most influential proponent of applying liberation theology to 
development communication (Steeves, 2001). For Friere, development 
communication is an emancipatory dialogue that expands individual and community 
consciousness and power without the burdens of hierarchy. Once people identify the 
sources of their oppression and the sources of their power, they find their own 
solutions. For development communication, the central focus should be face-to-face 
egalitarian dialogue that initiates and sustains a collective process of reflection and 
then action. This is spiritual practice for Friere with other religious practices such as 
song, dance and gatherings also helping the communication process (ibid).  
“The structures and processes of development communication may be 
conceptualised as serving at least three overlapping practical goals: marketing, 
collective resistance, and/or spiritual awakening” (ibid, p 239). 
Huesca (2003) contends that the openness required of participatory communication 
raises awareness of differences and inequalities, leading movements to address and 
transform them. Liberation theology’s call for action on behalf of the poor requires 
political involvement and activism in collaboration with other groups to challenge 
oppressive social structures. In Latin America at least, the most obvious collaborators 
in this project were (or are) Marxists because they too reject capitalism and the 
Western preoccupation with the individual over community. Huesca points out that 
this partnership would only ever be short-lived because of Marxism’s rejection of 
religion, its faith in science and its championing of armed revolution.   
 
Gender  
Gender plays a role in all development projects and is a central plank of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015.10 It is no less important in 
the Kingdom of Tonga, which has a fundamentally patriarchal culture, although 
traditionally women also hold some exalted family positions (James, 1997; 2003).  
Steeves (2003) argues that while gender is crucial to development communication 
scholarship and practice, it is also a very complex and highly contextual field. She 
                                                
10 The text of the third MDG reads: Promote gender equality and empower women. Eliminate gender 
disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.  
  39 
points out that one impoverished woman’s experience will differ dramatically from 
another’s because of her particular cultural, religious and political realities. As a 
result, many minority and Third World feminists have rejected Western feminist 
analyses because of their “monolithic notion of patriarchy”. This Steeves labels as 
ethnocentric, imperialistic and inaccurate. Despite this schism, there is a paucity of 
development communication studies into gender. The majority, according to Steeves, 
are concerned only with the representations of women in developing nation media, 
whereas only a small number look at women’s participation within media. For the 
vast majority of the world’s women, democratisation of communication and 
information is irrelevant, as they do not have access to basic telecommunication 
technologies. Of greater value, Steeves asserts, are projects to increase female 
literacy, make greater use of indigenous forms of communication, increase female 
education and empowerment, and encourage traditional women’s groups and 
networks.  
While Riaño (1994) agrees that development communication has traditionally 
overlooked the barriers faced by women in accessing development information, this 
has now changed. She asserts that development communication programmes are now 
being created to specifically target women:  
“Women as farmers, mothers, wives, agents of environmental protection and 
managers of households constitute subjects of information in development 
interventions. Women’s participation is encouraged in regard to three specific 
goals: (a) to change current critical practices, (b) to encourage active support 
and (c) to mobilise the community for mass campaigns” (p 444).  
 
Globalisation  
Globalisation, rather as the term implies, is a worldwide phenomenon that effects 
even geographically remote locations such as Tonga. This phenomenon, also known 
as ‘postmodern’, ‘postindustrial’ and ‘the information society’, is characterised by 
new communication technologies that have enabled accelerated restructuring of 
global capitalism. This has led to the significant alteration of production, distribution 
and consumption of goods, services and symbolic culture (Huesca, 2001). 
For Guttal (2007), the term globalisation describes a variety of economic, cultural, 
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social and political changes that have shaped the world for the last 50 years: 
“Its proponents claim that it is both ‘natural’ and an inevitable outcome of 
technological progress, and creates positive economic and political 
convergences. Critics argue that globalisation is hegemonic and antagonistic to 
local and national economies” (p 523).  
Huesca (2001) contends that the global restructuring experienced through 
globalisation has reduced the power, authority and credibility of traditional 
institutions, including development agencies. This same process has rendered the 
logic of modernisation and dependency obsolete, replacing them with an ‘anything 
goes’ spirit of free trade and “transnational regimes”. In response to globalisation and 
the diminishing legitimacy of traditional institutions, new global social movements 
have emerged. These coalesce around a variety of issues, including the environment, 
peace, human rights, labour standards and the activities of international institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund.  
The concept of participation itself has also been transformed by a globalised world. 
According to Cornish and Dunn (2009) participation advocates have taken on a wider 
view, expanding from:  
“… opportunities to rights, beneficiaries to citizens, projects to policies, 
consultation to decision-making, micro to macro” (p 668). 
But Guttal (2007) takes a less positive view of development’s response to 
globalisation, arguing that the development industry has been globalisation’s most 
effective “portals” with some of the most powerful actors in the globalisation arena 
being part of the mainstream development establishment. Those actors include 
international finance institutions, UN agencies, academics, think tanks, civil society 
organisations and consultants “all of whom devise the applications by which 
economic globalisation is operationalised” (p 527). 
Guttal adds that an underlying paradox of globalisation is that the same forces that 
promote global capitalism also promote democracy, human rights, and government 
intervention:  
“This is paradoxical, because global capitalism cannot survive in an ethical 
climate that promotes genuine democracy and fundamental human rights, nor 
does it favour independent-minded states” (p 529).  
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Leal (2007) similarly argues that the international development industry is a chief 
conduit for globalisation, something stated in plainly in 2000 by world governments 
ratifying the Millennium Development Goals. Leal points out that the declared goal of 
halving global poverty by 2015 is littered with terms such as ‘sustainability’, 
‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘equality’, and ‘democracy’, but no mention is made 
of forces that produce poverty:  
“Maintaining a politically and conceptually ambiguous stance, the MDG 
declaration affirms that ‘the central challenge’ faced by the planet’s 
governments and respective institutions is ‘to ensure that [neo-liberal] 
globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s poor’ (United 
Nations General Assembly 2000: 2)” (Leal, 2007: p 543). 
Globalisation also affects mass media. From the 1980s, media companies have 
consolidated into media empires that are increasingly commercialised, driven by 
market logic and focused on ratings. Gumucio-Dagron and Tuft (2006) assert that 
civil society’s response has been to professionalize their communications and media 
strategies in the hope of gaining better access to “privately-controlled mediated public 
spheres”. In the process they focus on events and actions to gain media attention 
causing development ideals and arguments to be oversimplified. The pair refer to 
Ignacio Ramonet’s 1997 contention that because of this new focus, the news media 
can no longer claim a ‘fourth estate’ role. By joining with existing political and 
economic estates, the news media no longer has any interest in a civic objective – 
safeguarding the community against abuses of power by public and private elites. 
Ramonet’s answer is to create a fifth estate that denounces the “hyper-power of the 
media conglomerates” complicit in the neo-liberal globalisation agenda.  
 
Gaps in development communication theory  
As with any analysis, gaps exist in development communication theory either through 
omission or because conditions change requiring renewed appraisal. One problem that 
scholars have identified is that communication is rarely given adequate recognition 
when development practitioners are designing interventions (Gumucio-Dagron, 
2009). Inagaki (2007) contends this will only be mitigated when the strategic value of 
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communication is widely recognised. Until then, development projects will give 
communication a secondary role with a commensurate budget:  
“Underutilization of communication – giving only implicit and common 
sensual roles to communication without associating it with specific mandates 
on contents, channels, forms, actors, timing and so forth, based on firm 
theoretical underpinnings – is not an uncommon practice in international 
assistance programs perennially strained by limited budget and human 
resources” (p 2). 
The status of development communication is not assisted by conceptual problems 
resulting from a lack of clear definitions and the persistent confusion around 
fundamental terms such as ‘information’ (one way) and ‘communication’ (multiple 
ways). This is particularly true of participatory projects and the communication that 
characterises them (Jacobson and Storey, 2004; Gumucio-Dagron, 2009; Cornish and 
Dunn, 2009; Inagaki, 2007).  
This confusion also leads to difficulties in evaluating development communication 
outcomes. In addressing this problem, Gumucio-Dagron (2009) states that while 
evaluation is necessary, he asks what should and can be measured?:  
“Evaluation shouldn’t be about counting, but about the quality of life 
improvement. Social change cannot be evaluated in the same ways as rice 
production or the manufacturing of bicycles” (p 461). 
Snyder (2003) points out that despite many years of communication campaigns, very 
few qualitative studies have been conducted into their effectiveness. For example, 
only 11 per cent of Uganda AIDS campaigns undertaken in the late 1990s were later 
measured to establish how many people were reached, let alone how many had 
actually changed their behaviour. By not evaluating campaigns, much valuable 
information is lost forever on which is the best approach for a particular group, region 
or nation. 
As stated earlier, evaluations of diffusion programmes seem primarily concerned with 
how, when or where someone heard a message, not with what they thought of that 
message (Melkote and Steeves 2001). This preoccupation with mechanisms rather 
than the message itself means the original aim of an intervention can be undermined. 
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Meanwhile, the impact of corruption on development communication practice 
remains to be documented and theorised more fully claim Wilkins and Mody (2001). 
This is especially the case where it impacts on the long-term consequences of 
individual projects, larger programmes and on social dimensions. They also warn 
against an undue preoccupation with new communication technologies: 
“The history of development communication discourse establishes a trend of 
excitement about one new technology after another, as scholars and 
practitioners proclaimed the benefits that radio, satellite television, video and 
other channels would bring to development projects. New computer 
technologies need to be looked at in this context” (p 391). 
 
Conclusion 
Theoretical debate on development communication has closely followed the arc of 
wider development discourse starting from post-war modernisation theories through 
to debates on the effects of neo-liberal economics and globalisation. Development 
communication itself did not become a widely debated branch of development 
discourse until the 1960s and the theories of diffusion first articulated by Everett 
Rogers (1963). Modernisation and diffusion have remccording to Gumucio-Dagron 
(2009), participation is communication and vice versa.  
These – modernisation, diffusion and participation – then are the three main themes 
identified in this chapter. Also addressed are secondary themes of social marketing, 
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In particular, MORDI Tonga applies a virtual blueprint of participatory themes 
identified by Uphoff, and associated communication practices separately identified by 
Inagaki and Snyder.  
The following chapter will look at the history and background of Tonga’s political 
and media landscapes. This will take the research from a global, academic view of 
development communication and place it more firmly within the local and 
contemporary context of Tonga.   
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Chapter four: Political and media systems in Tonga 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a brief outline of Tonga’s history post-European contact 
with special attention given to the birth and evolution of its unique political system. 
This is a necessary first step in gaining an understanding of the forces that have 
influenced and shaped the Kingdom of Tonga’s contemporary political environment, 
and the challenges faced by development agencies. This short history will focus on 
events over the past 40 years that led to the much-anticipated November 2010 General 
Election. This election was the first to be held under an amended constitution: one 
that handed the Tongan people (commoners) 17 of 26 seats in parliament and, for the 
first time, a majority of votes. The Tongan people, through their elected 
representatives, can now outvote the nobles and – theoretically, at least – dictate to 
the king (all new laws still require the Royal Assent). While immediate results of the 
election will be included in this chapter, it is too soon to assess the long term outcome 
or say how the election might effect development agencies working in Tonga.  
The momentous change to Tonga’s 135-year-old constitution cames nearly four 
decades after calls for greater democracy, transparency and accountability first gained 
public attention in the island kingdom. Those calls grew as Tongans became 
increasingly dismayed at the financial mismanagement and poor governance 
repeatedly demonstrated by its mostly non-elected leadership. Aid donors, especially 
New Zealand and Australia, took up calls for greater accountability; appeals that 
became more pronounced after Tonga’s economy stumbled in the 1970s with loss of 
its key export earners, copra and bananas. Over time, Tonga’s economy became 
increasingly dependent upon remittances from citizens living overseas and from 
foreign aid. This has only served to highlight scandals that have dogged Tonga’s 
quasi-feudal leadership. At a time when international donor agencies have sought 
answers to the causes of intractable Third World poverty, governance has increasingly 
came under the spotlight. In this environment, flagrant displays of ineptitude and poor 
governance by Tonga’s leadership could no longer be ignored at home or abroad.  
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Inextricably connected to that governance agenda is the role of the news media. This 
chapter will investigate the recent history of Tonga’s mainstream news media to shed 
light on how the Fourth Estate has performed, or failed to perform, as community 
‘watchdog’. Secondly, an appraisal of Tonga’s media – its reach, audience and control 
– will also provide essential background related to a central theme of this thesis – 
communication.  
 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
All nations are unique – singled out by customs, language, political systems, 
geography and so on. Tonga is no different. While it shares a common ancestry with 
near Pacific neighbours and has periodically had extensive contacts with them, most 
notably Fiji, by comparison to mainland Asian or European cultures, Tonga’s has 
remained relatively cosseted for the better part of 3000 years. Unsurprisingly, this 
seclusion has produced an identity that is exclusively Tongan. Today, however, it is 
Tonga’s constitutional monarchy – the only remaining monarchy in the Pacific – 
rather than its language or customs that truly sets it apart from other nations. Tonga 
also has one of the oldest extant constitutions in the world, and can proudly proclaim 
it was never colonised, unlike other island nations around it11 (Campbell, 1992, 2001; 
Powels, 2007).  
Tonga’s Constitutional Monarchy has ruled for 135 years. It was created by 
Taufa’ahau, a regional chief who unified the islands of Tonga under his leadership, 
declaring himself King George Taufa’ahua Tupou I in 1845. In 1875, with the 
assistance of Wesleyan missionary Reverend Shirley Baker, he wrote what is agreed 
to be a remarkably progressive document for its time, the Constitution of Tonga 
(Powles, 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [NZ], 2010). It included a 
Declaration of Rights guaranteeing individual freedoms and equality for all, 
prohibited slavery, and enshrined legal rights such as Habeas Corpus and the right to a 
timely and fair trial. It also guaranteed freedom of the press.  
Crucially, the constitution cemented the king’s own position by relegating rivals to 
permanently subordinate roles. Under the constitution the status of 20 chiefs (later 
                                                
11 New Zealand journalist Michael Field (2010) somewhat undercuts this claim by stating Tongan 
leaders in fact “… pleaded with assorted powers for annexation, settling only in the end with a British 
protectorateship, reluctantly agreed” (p 85).   
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increased to 30) was entrenched by the king and only he could confer or remove what 
would become hereditary titles (Powles, 2007). These chiefs, or nobles as they 
became known, controlled parliament and, together with a further six estate-holding 
chiefs, controlled almost all land12.  
As well as guaranteeing numerous rights for Tongans, the 1875 constitution created a 
three-tier class system consisting of the royal family, nobles and commoners. The 
constitution also transformed traditional kinship-based fealty into a citizen-state 
relationship. Land leases are distributed to male commoners via the nobles (private 
land ownership is illegal for royalty, nobles and commoners alike), commoners are 
taxed and they must perform jury duty. Families are also obliged to pay levies to 
nobles, normally in farm produce, some of which is ultimately paid to the king 
(Powles, 2009).   
This remains the bedrock of the Tongan political system and is regarded by most 
Tongans as a central part of their traditional identity (James, 2003; Powles, 2009). In 
fact, the monarchy and the constitution were foreign concepts imported largely in 
response to contact with Europeans and the very real threat of colonisation. The 
Samoan Matai system and Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs share a similar genesis 
(Meleisea, 2000). A key reason that King Tupou I adopted the constitution was to 
convince foreign powers that Tonga had acceptable government institutions and was 
politically stable enough to govern itself without outside assistance or interference 
(Powles, 2007; Campbell, 1992). As it was, Tonga became a protectorate of Britain 
from 1900 to 1970. Modern Tonga, as a result, is an amalgam of Christianity, British 
concepts of government and law (constitutional monarchy), and US-style notions of a 
powerful executive (Powles, 2009; Koloamatingi, 2009). This is overlaid onto an 
indigenous hierarchical social structure with a strong sense of kinship allegiance and 
deference to social and political superiors (faka’apa’apa). This combination is 
conducive to the formation of broad power bases and of social classes (Powels, 2007).  
 
                                                
12 Land in Tonga cannot be sold. All town and beach-front land belongs to the government with the 
remainder divided among the nobles. They in turn rent it to the people at rates decided by the 
legislative assembly. The constitution also set out terms under which land could be leased. The first-
born son inherits land. Where there is no male heir, inheritance passes through the female line but not 
to a female heir (Campbell, 1992). By the late 1990s with a rapidly expanding population, most land 
had been allocated resulting in some abuses of position by nobles (James, 1997).   
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Government  
The 1875 constitution made the monarch head of the state, government and 
Commander-in-chief of the military forces (Powles, 2007). The government includes 
the monarch, Privy Council, Cabinet, Legislative Assembly and Judiciary. The 
executive decision making body is comprised of the monarch’s appointees sitting in 
the Privy Council and Cabinet. The Privy Council includes the monarch, the Prime 
Minister and other ministers, and has the supreme executive authority. Its role is to 
assist the monarch to formulate policies that may become law subject to confirmation 
by Parliament (in Tongan, the Privy Council is called the fakataha tokoni, meaning 
assisting forum). The Legislative Assembly comprises nobles and People’s 
Representatives, who together pass laws that are in turn interpreted by the judiciary. 
As in the UK, the Tongan Privy Council is the highest court of appeal. Cabinet is 
appointed by the King and is chaired by the Prime Minister. Cabinet also has veto 
powers over appointment of the Ha’apai and Vava’u governors. 
Constitutional amendments tabled ahead of the 2010 election made several far-
reaching changes to Parliament. It reduced the number of seats from 30 to 26. 
Crucially, 17 of these seats are now are reserved for commoners or People’s 
Representatives. The remaining nine go to hereditary nobles, who are elected by 
noble families. The Prime Minister and Speaker of the House were once both 
appointed by the King, but following the 2010 election this appointment is voted on 
by the elected Members of Parliament.  
At a national level, the Tongan government controls the disbursement of most 
overseas aid funds, runs commercial ventures (often in competition with private 
firms) and is the country’s largest single employer. This position of primacy is 
underpinned by Tonga’s culture of deference, as explained by Kerry James (2003):  
“The theatre of cultural hegemony is reinforced by honorific terms of address, 
the use of formal language, and the etiquette of deference, which may include 
seating oneself on the floor to speak to a noble minister in his office” (p 326).  
Even with the transformative effects of ever-greater numbers of Tongans living 
abroad during the past 30 years, this “etiquette of deference” remains the dominant 
cultural model. It is played out throughout government and the private sector, within 
NGOs, churches and villages, right down to the family level (ibid).   
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National political change 
In 2005, an inquiry by the New Zealand Parliament’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee into the country’s relationship with Tonga raised concerns about the 
political and economic power held by Tonga’s royal family. It said this control stifled 
reforms that could benefit ordinary Tongans at a time when its economy was 
shrinking and many Tongans were reverting to subsistence living. The inquiry also 
cited a 2001 report from the then New Zealand High Commissioner Brian Smyth to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Smyth wrote: 
“The [Royal] family has held on to absolute power and privilege for far longer 
than most other royal lines. Unlike monarchies elsewhere there has been no 
evolution over time … Democracy is a foul word in this Kingdom ... The King, 
the rest of the Royal family and the nobles sit at the pinnacle of this system and 
understandably want to stay there. The puzzle is why the public let them get 
away with it – particularly in this day and age, with experience of overseas 
liberties and with such clear evidence of corruption and mismanagement ... 
From a socialist perspective the system is anathema. It involves redistribution 
from the poor to the rich.” (p 8). 
One of the 17 recommendations made by the New Zealand committee was to work 
alongside the Tongan government “to facilitate change towards representative 
democracy by supporting the Tongan judiciary, Legislative Assembly and public 
service.” 13 
 
Democracy movement 
Challenges to the government had gained momentum for over 30 years, led largely by 
a faction of commoner politicians and supported by independent media since the late 
1980s. This group articulated growing popular resentment over government failings, 
especially financial mismanagement (Campbell, 2005). A leading figure of that 
movement remains ‘Akilisi Pohiva, a former teacher who was drummed out of the 
public service in 1984 after fronting a radio series critical of the government. Pohiva 
did not take his fate lightly, successfully suing the government in 1988 for unfair 
                                                
13 Unsurisingly, the committee’s request to visit Tonga was denied by the Tongan government, which 
viewed the committee’s work as NZ interference in domestic policies (Koloamatingi, 2009). 
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dismissal. He also launched an occasional newspaper Kele’a (conch shell), the first 
independent newspaper in Tonga since the 1880s, and mouthpiece for growing 
demands for change in Tonga.14  
In 1987, Pohiva was elected to parliament as a People’s Representative. This win 
came largely as a result of revelations published in the second issue of Kele’a 
detailing the generous allowances paid to MPs who took part in a 12-day tour of the 
Tongan islands. The expedition was initiated to explain controversial 1986 tax laws, 
but it was alleged some MPs more than doubled their annual salaries through the 
junket (Campbell, 1992). The 1987 election is widely recognised as Tonga’s first 
where political concerns overshadowed traditional kinship and geographic 
allegiances. It produced a landslide for pro-democracy candidates with all but three of 
the nine incumbent People’s Representatives ousted in favour of young, educated 
politicians (for the first time, six of the nine People’s Representatives elected had 
university degrees). Several of those voted out of office blamed the result on articles 
in the Kele’a (James, 2003; Moala, 2002).  
Pohiva has made his name as a firebrand Member of Parliament ever since, 
demanding change and seeking to impeach ministers he believed were guilty of 
mismanagement or corruption. He is the longest serving People’s Representative, “the 
champion of the people and scourge of the government” (Campbell, 2008: p 2), and 
easily wins his parliamentary seat at each election.  
This newly elected faction of pro-democracy, commoner politicians coalesced into a 
loose political grouping with Pohiva as nominal head and has steadily transformed 
political behaviour and public perceptions since. In 1992, what had become known as 
the Pro-Democracy Movement held the first of several conventions on constitutional 
change, producing specific proposals that were then presented to government. The 
conventions and related education campaigns revealed a deep-seated sense of 
grievance among ordinary Tongans over perceived corruption among nobles and the 
king’s indifference to these abuses. (Powles, 2007, 2009; Campbell, 2005).  
                                                
14 During its first years Kele’a was more a pamphlet – an occasional publication dealing stridently with 
contemporary political issues. It re-launched in 2004 as a commercial newspaper and is now the most 
popular weekly in Tonga, selling out within hours of hitting newsstands. ‘Akilisi has since handed over 
direct editorial control to his son, Siosiua Po’oi Pohiva, who is listed as publisher of the paper. 
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But the government ignored Pro-Democracy Movement calls for change despite these 
initially being quite modest. The reformers sought greater government transparency in 
public spending and greater representation of the people in parliamentary decision-
making, not a radical overhaul of Tongan society or an end to the monarchy. In 10 
years up to 1998, six parliamentary motions calling for specific constitutional reforms 
or for the formation of a constitutional review committee had all failed to get traction 
in a Parliament dominated by nobles (Campbell, 1992; 2005). However, the 
movement for change would not be fobbed off forever. In 1998 the Pro-Democracy 
Movement Committee – formed to write specific constitutional changes –became the 
Human Rights and Democracy Movement of Tonga (HRDMT). Like its predecessor, 
the HRDMT refused to call itself a party, claiming instead that it was a movement for 
change.  
 
Government scandals 
Meanwhile, government had become embroiled in numerous scandals involving state 
funds, nepotism and irresponsible use of government positions. One drawn-out saga 
in particular reflected badly upon King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV, proving pivotal in the 
eyes of many Tongans and a vote-winner for the pro-democracy movement.  
As early as 1983, the government had sold Tongan passports to foreigners, mostly 
Chinese nationals. In 1990, Pohiva and fellow People’s Representatives alleged the 
practice was illegal as the foreigners had not fulfilled conditions required by the 
constitution before they were naturalised and issued with passports. Of the 426 who 
had been issued with a passport, many had never set foot in Tonga, including former 
Philippine dictator Ferninand Mracos and his wife Emelda (Moala, 2002). The 
passports were selling for as much US$37,000 and the government was reported to 
have eventually earned as much as US$50m from their sale. Pohiva hired a New 
Zealand QC to sue the government and have the practice stopped.  
In 1991 protests over the passport scheme saw around 2000 people march to the 
Royal Palace to present the king with a petition of several thousand names protesting 
the granting of citizenship to non-residents. Faced with growing popular anger and the 
very real prospect the passports would be declared illegal in court, the government 
called an emergency session of the Legislative Assembly in February 1991 to amend 
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the constitution making the passport sales legal retroactively. The issue proved crucial 
for many Tongans as it demonstrated that problems within government went beyond 
mere misconduct by individual ministers of which the King was ignorant. To the 
contrary, the King had been made well aware of the passports issue and public 
concern via marches and petitions.  
“Their importunities received no public response, no reforms were made, no 
cabinet reshuffle followed. The passport and naturalisation retrospective 
legislation received royal assent. Royal ignorance was now no longer a viable 
explanation. It could still be argued however, that although the king knew, he 
was powerless to constrain his ministers, or feared dismissing them for lack of 
suitable alternatives. Alternatively, he knew and did not care, or knew and 
approved. Whether the king bore responsibility or not, the glaring fact now was 
that the problem was constitutional” (Campbell, 2005: p 97). 
Despite the retrospective legislation, the scandal refused to go away. In 2001, it was 
revealed that US$20 million from the passport sales held in a trust fund in San 
Francisco had been lost in a dubious investment scheme promoted by an American 
associate of the King. The Minister of Justice and Minister of Education, who were 
trustees of the fund, were held responsible and instructed to resign from cabinet. No 
other action has since been taken to recover the money.  
 
Attacks on the media  
The government’s image was to be further tarnished by botched attempts to muzzle 
the press. In the spotlight was Taimi ‘o Tonga, a weekly newspaper launched by 
Kalafi Moala in 1989. The government passed two bills in 2003 modelled on 
Singaporean media-control legislation: the Media Operators Bill and the Newspapers 
Bill (Robie, 2004). To pass these, the government first had to amend freedom of 
speech clauses in the constitution. The move created widespread outrage with 10,000 
Tongans signing a petition against the legislation and thousands more marching in 
protest. Nevertheless, the bills were given royal assent in October 2003. By January 
2004, they had been challenged in court and by October the court had declared them 
unconstitutional (Campbell, 2006).  
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Hot on the heels of that embarrassment came another very public debacle in 2004 
with collapse of Royal Tongan Airlines. This time the royal family was implicated via 
the Crown Prince, although it was three government ministers who were dismissed 
from cabinet.  
“Thus in three years, the government’s reputation for competence and 
integrity had suffered more than usual damage: five ministers dismissed and 
three major controversies” (ibid: p 55). 
The run-up to the 2005 elections would see further body blows to the government’s 
reputation. Demonstrations over electricity price rises and a new consumption tax 
forced embarrassing government back-downs, but the real damage came with the June 
2005 introduction of a new civil service salary structure awarding wage increases to 
civil servants insultingly stingy compared to those won by parliamentarians 
(Campbell, 2008). A six-week civil service strike ensued and only ended when 
government conceded salary increases of up to 80 per cent.  
“The affair had a number of unusual characteristics: the solidarity of the 
strikers, their refusal to deal with mediators, and their refusal to negotiate; the 
effrontery and insolence of the rhetoric on Pangai Si‘I;15 and, finally, the 
joining of industrial demands to political demands. The latter included, among 
others, the return of electricity generation to the government [this had been 
taken over by the Crown Prince], democratic reforms and the resignation of 
the Prime Minister Prince Lavaka” (ibid: p 98). 
 
Democratic reforms 
The same year, 2005, saw parliament take its first official steps toward greater 
democracy when it created the National Committee for Political Reform (NCPR). The 
King’s nephew, Prince Tu’ipelehake Uluvalu, a popular royal who had often sided 
with commoners, was named chair of the committee, which comprised six MPs and 
four ‘independent Tongan professionals’. The committee gave itself less than a year 
to consider submissions, hold informal talks on legislative changes and submit reports 
to both the King and Parliament (Powles, 2007). But what was intended to diffuse 
                                                
15 A grassed field outside parliament where strike rallies were held daily in Nuku’alofa.  
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opposition only ended up inflaming it. According to Campbell (2008), the NCPR 
report delivered to parliament in October 2006:  
“... conceded everything that the reform lobby had been calling for during the 
previous 15 years: a government responsible to an elected parliament; the 
exercise of royal prerogatives on the advice of an elected prime minister; the 
retention of the status of royalty and nobility” (p 102).  
Hard-line reformers inside and outside parliament insisted upon the immediate 
adoption of the recommendations. The government, meanwhile, favoured a more 
circumspect approach. By November Parliament was still debating its options – a 
pace that incensed hard-line reformers and a large and increasingly rowdy crowd in 
Pangai Si‘i Park. Feelings became even more inflamed after it became known 
Parliament would adjourn for the year rather than make a final decision on the NCPR 
report. On November 16, the crowd erupted into violence, sacking downtown 
Nuku’alofa.  
What Tongans now dub “16/11” killed eight, destroyed many buildings and 
businesses, and was even branded an attempted coup by Lopeti Senituli, press 
secretary and adviser to the Prime Minister (Planet-Tonga.com, 2006). The riot was a 
watershed moment for Tonga and saw five incumbent People’s Representatives 
charged with sedition. They were 'Akilisi Pohiva, 'Isileli Pulu, William Clive 
Edwards, 'Uliti Uata and Lepolo Taunisila. The five were eventually acquitted on 
appeal in 2009 after the court said the prosecution had not provided enough evidence.  
Despite, or perhaps because of, the riot, the government and the King signalled in 
January 2007 a determination to proceed with NCPR recommendations. In July 2008, 
the Constitutional and Electoral Commission Bill was passed setting up a commission 
to investigate electoral reform. As with the NCPR before it, the commission had a 
tight timeframe – less than a year to elicit submissions (these could only be lodged by 
groups of 200 people or more) and to hold 17 public forums (five in Vava’u, four 
Ha’apai, one on Eua and the Niuas, and six on Tongatapu). In its June 2009 Interim 
Report, the commissioners said that they sensed…  
“A widespread and clearly articulated feeling that central government has 
failed to reach many communities and individuals. It was apparent that many 
Tongans have little interest in politics or the structure of government. This 
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may arise partly from a lack of ability to affect change over many generations, 
but comments in the outer districts suggest it also stems from the need to 
support themselves and their families and a perception that government 
however formed, will simply continue to neglect their interests and devote 
most of its time, energy and resources to the central districts” (Powles, 2009:  
p 144-145).  
In April 2010, legislation amending the constitution was passed providing a new 26-
seat Parliament. The main island of Tongatapu would have 10 seats, Vava’u three (up 
from two), while the Niuas and Eua would retain just one representative each. These 
seats would also represent defined electorates with each MP voted in by their 
constituents. Previously, parliamentarians would represent an entire island whether it 
was Eua with just one MP or Tongatapu with several. (RNZ, 2010-a). 
In the lead up to the November 2010 election, extensive education campaigns on 
changes to the electoral system were accompanied by a drive to enrol voters. These 
campaigns were undertaken by several NGOs, but just 40,000 Tongans had registered 
to vote by the deadline of August 31, 2010. Tonga has a population of 104,000 (RNZ, 
2010-c). 
 
The 2010 Election 
As widely predicted, the Friendly Islands Democratic Party (FIDP) headed by 'Akilisi 
Pohiva claimed a landslide victory taking 12 of the 17 People’s Representative seats 
with five going to independents. However, with nine of the 26 parliamentary seats 
reserved for nobles, the FIDP missed the absolute majority it had hoped for. The next 
step for the new MPs was to elect a Prime Minister by secret ballot. Initially, Pohiva 
seemed assured of securing the required votes and the nobles stated they wanted to 
“work closely with the party to move the country forward” (RNZ, 2010-d). However, 
Pohiva’s dominant position crumbled after the nine nobles themselves gained support 
of the five independent MPs and another of FIDP’s own –Niua MP Sosefo Vakata – 
defected to the noble’s camp (RNZ, 2010-e).  
On December 21, Tongatapu noble, Lord Tu'ivakano, was named Prime Minister. The 
58-year-old received 14 votes to Pohiva’s 12. Ten days later he named his 11-man 
cabinet, which included six People’s Representatives, three nobles and two 
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commoners from outside the legislature. One cabinet position went to Pohiva 
(Minister of Health), while another went to his FIDP colleague, Isileli Pulu. One of 
two cabinet roles from outside Parliament went to Clive Edwards, a former police 
chief who lost his seat in the election (Matangi Tonga Online, 2010; RNZ, 2010-f).  
Just 17 days after being appointed, Pohiva quit his cabinet role. The announcement 
came a day before cabinet members were to be sworn in and parliament officially 
opened. In a letter published on the Ministry of Information and Communication’s 
website (since removed), Pohiva explained that he objected to cabinet ministers being 
appointed from outside of Parliament when his own party had elected members 
qualified to fill such roles. He also objected to signing a cabinet agreement in which 
required he agree not to vote against the government (Stuff.co.nz, 2010). While both 
objections are understandable given Pohiva’s political record, political commentators 
have also pointed out that he would find it virtually impossible to mount a credible 
and effective opposition to government while holding a cabinet post. This would not 
be lost on a man who has made a career out of being a government opponent.  
 
Local politics 
At the community level in Tonga, especially on the remote islands, it is the District 
Officer and Town Officer who wield a decisive influence. The 'ofisa kolo, Town 
Officer, is elected every three years. He (the post is invariably held by a male) reports 
to the District Officer ('ofisa fa kavahe fopua) and is the government’s representative 
in the village. It is the Town Officer who relays government decisions from the local 
governor or from the Prime Minister’s Office to the community through monthly 
community meetings or fonos. The Town Officer resolves community disputes and 
maintains law and order (he has powers of arrest if there is no police presence in the 
community). He is also the community representative to government, so will lobby 
ministries on behalf of his community (Bennardo and Cappell, 2008; ’Alamoti 
Tautakitaki, MORDI Community Facilitator,  
Interview 2010).  
Nearly all the NGOs spoken to for this thesis agreed that the Town Officer plays an 
important role in their projects.  
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“With all projects the Town Officer plays a critical role. The Town Officer 
calls a meeting of the community and arranges a venue. He selects the people 
who should participate. Although we usually send a participant list and check 
that the right people are being told” (Emily Esau, Tonga Community 
Development Trust, interview 2010).  
According to the Tonga Community Development Trust, the Kingdom’s oldest NGO, 
traditional governance structures, especially at the village level, are often based on 
land tenure and it is the noble who makes the important decisions. However, since the 
creation of the Town Officer role, nobles have increasingly abdicated their 
governance duties. Village committees remain the forum where issues affecting a 
community are thrashed out with the Town Officer calling and facilitating meetings. 
The NGO admitted, however, that committee meetings can be captured by one group 
within the community, whether it be the Town Officer, a wealthy family or the local 
noble. The result is that community members increasingly see meetings as irrelevant.  
 
Politics and development 
So what relevance do these national and local political machinations have for 
development workers? According to Richard Englehardt (2000):  
“All development issues are management issues embedded in a matrix of power 
at the family, village, tribal, national, regional and global levels” (p 178). 
While national-level political manoeuvrings may have little day-to-day impact on 
Tonga’s most impoverished, especially those in the remote island groups, the 
frustrations that spurred People’s Representatives mirror growing public 
dissatisfaction with the monarchy, increasing poverty and indifferent local 
governance. James (2003) contends that this sense of frustration was actively 
encouraged among villagers by:  
“… better-educated protesters who use the media, debates in parliament, and 
faikava meetings (where men congregate to imbibe the national beverage and 
discuss matters of import)16 to educate villagers about their rights of citizenship 
and the illegal abuse of privilege by members of the government” (p 331). 
                                                
16 Faikava or kava clubs are a growing phenomena in Tonga and other Pacific islands. For more 
information on their importance for development NGOs see chapter 6.  
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The implications are two-fold for aid agencies. Firstly, demands for greater 
transparency by the pro-democracy movement dovetail neatly with donor demands 
for improved governance and aid budget oversight. Governance was an area 
specifically identified for action by the 2005 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee report into New Zealand’s relationship with Tonga referred to above. 
Subsequently in 2008, New Zealand committed $1.5 million to supporting democratic 
reforms, focusing on civic education and public participation, as well as support for 
the Electoral Commission. AusAID too made democratic reforms a priority by 
supporting the Tonga Constitutional and Electoral Commission, along with an 
extensive public awareness campaign of 151 community workshops and 46 half-hour 
television programmes. 
Secondly, the consciousness-raising activities of pro-democracy groups weakened 
Tonga’s traditional faka’apa’apa culture of deference to one’s social superiors. 
Inevitably, this impacts on village-level attitudes towards development, and will 
likely encourage communities to demand greater input and control over development 
projects affecting them. For development workers, understanding political structures 
can be crucial to the success of an initiative. This is just as important at the village or 
community level as it is at the national level.  
“If local-level development gaols are to be pursued successfully, it is essential 
to identify the people of influence and authority who can get things done or 
stifle efforts in the area singled out for attention. This is especially true of 
programmes which require a strong element of participatory development” 
(James, 2000: p 132). 
 
TONGAN MEDIA 
During a preliminary research trip to Tonga in April 2010, I investigated aspects of 
the Kingdom’s mainstream media. Research prior to the trip seemed to bear out the 
notion that Tonga’s media was tightly controlled, censored and occasionally directly 
gagged by the government. In 2010, international NGO, Freedom House, described 
the Tongan press as being Partly Free and ranked it at 70 out of 196 nations, giving it 
a score of 32 (0 being most free and 100 the least free) (Freedom House, 2010). These 
assessments were backed by considerable evidence showing that Tonga’s news media 
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had at times been under siege from authorities. This included attempts to muzzle 
reporting, the detention of journalists and editors, and legislation that banned 
newspapers. This assessment was backed by long-time Television New Zealand 
Pacific correspondent Barbara Dreaver, who described journalism in Tonga as “grim” 
during an April 2010 edition of TVNZ’s Media7 show (TVNZ, 2010). 
But despite this apparent climate of media hardship, the Tongan population seems 
well informed. The pro-democracy movement, which has long highlighted issues of 
corruption and poor governance, remains vocal and its popularity has increased. With 
the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that government hopes of dampening demands 
for political change through the blunt cudgel of media censorship was a flawed and 
counterproductive strategy. Flawed or not, these attacks must have had a chilling 
effect on an independent news media. Within days of arriving in the capital 
Nuku’alofa in April 2010, my assumptions about Tonga’s mainstream media were 
turned completely on their head. It was soon apparent that despite repeated 
government attempts to silence media critics, Tonga boasts an active and vibrant 
mainstream news media with four weekly newspapers, a well respected news website 
and an expanding stable of private radio and television stations.  
Kalafi Moala, one of Tonga’s most well-respected journalists and newspaper editors, 
set the record straight after being told of Barbara Dreaver’s description of Tongan 
journalism being “grim”: 
“Media is very free here. Things are taken out of context, usually from 
outside. Things have changed a lot in Tonga” (Moala, interview 2010). 
Most of that change has occurred over the past decade, especially since the Tongan 
government’s now infamous 2003 attempt to legislate control of the print media. 
Those measures – the Media Operators Act 2003, Newspaper Act 2003 and Act of 
Constitution of Tonga (Amendment) Act 2003 – it is widely agreed were aimed at 
stifling independent newspaper Taimi o’ Tonga (Singh and Prakash, 2006;  
Campbell, 2006). 
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Launched in 1989, Taimi o’ Tonga, or Times of Tonga, was the first independent 
commercial newspaper to be printed in over 100 years in the kingdom.17 Within six 
years it would become the target of government efforts to silence it when, in 1996, the 
paper’s owner and publisher, Kalafi Moala, and its editor, Filokalafi Akau’ola, were 
imprisoned for contempt of parliament. The unprecedented case followed reports in 
the paper of a parliamentary motion to censure a government minister. The pair, along 
with People’s Representative ‘Akilisi Pohiva (accused of leaking the information), 
were sentenced to 30 days in prison. The Supreme Court later declared these 
sentences unconstitutional and released the trio, who were subsequently awarded a 
total of US$26,000 in compensation (Robie, 2004).  
In 2003, the Constitution of Tonga again protected the newspaper; this time because 
of government attempts to amend Clause 7 guaranteeing free speech and press 
freedom. This attempt was followed up with the Media Operators Act 2003 and the 
Newspaper Act 2003. All three attempts to muzzle Taimi o’ Tonga (and by 
association, all other print media in Tonga) were later deemed unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in 2004 (RNZ, 2004).  
In response to the government’s 2003 attacks, journalists and media outlets formed 
the Media Council Incorporated to represent the news media, establish an effective 
complaints committee, encourage journalism training and engage with government on 
media related issues (Matangi Tonga Online). So, rather than stifle the press, 
government attacks on media freedoms have encouraged a flourishing of mainstream, 
independent media. This is confirmed by Kalafi Moala, who describes Tongan media 
as free, especially Tongan-language newspapers which publish very “lively”, content 
on “politics, parliamentary debates and crime” (Interview 2010).  
Following his prosecution by government, Moala has become something of a local 
media mogul, adding the Tonga Chronicle18 to his print stable and getting involved in 
FM radio and television channels (ibid). His former Taimi o’ Tonga editor, Filokalafi 
                                                
17 The Kele’a or Conch Shell had been launched 12-18 months earlier by People’s Representative 
‘Akilisi Pohiva, but at the time it was an occasional publication and could not be classed as a 
mainstream newspaper.  
18 The Tonga Chronicle was government owned but Moala took over the paper under a three-year deal. 
He immediately made it an English-language newspaper, saying this was an untapped market. There is 
little doubt the editorial style (staid by comparison with Tongan-language papers) is influenced by the 
deal Moala struck for the paper, which sees government retain ownership (RNZ, 2009; Kalafi Moala 
interview 2010).   
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Akau’ola, has also contributed to a flowering of media, opening a rival weekly 
newspaper called Talaki in 2003. Meanwhile, the Kele’a was relaunched in 2004 and 
is now a weekly paper run on a commercial footing with Pohiva’s son, Siosiua Po’oi 
Pohiva, listed as publisher. Added to this mix are several regularly published church-
based newspapers that discuss current events, and the Public Service Association 
publishes a newspaper as well.  
 
Broadcast media 
Freedom of the broadcast media is a different story, however. Like print media, radio 
and television were until recently exclusively owned by the government. High start-
up costs especially for television is one reason for government’s domination of 
broadcast media, but the State also enjoys far greater legislative controls over 
broadcasters. This is maintained directly through the Communications Act, and 
indirectly through broadcaster licensing and spectrum allocations.  
The Tonga Broadcasting Commission (TBC) was established by Queen Salote Tupou 
III in 1961 to run a single AM radio station, ZCO. The commission remains solely 
owned by the Tongan government, but now operates two free-to-air TV channels – 
Television Tonga and Television Tonga 2. It also operates a commercial AM radio 
station, Radio Tonga; one commercial FM channel, Kool 90FM; and a 24-hour Radio 
Australia relay channel. 
In 1991, King Taufa‘ahau Tupou IV added some competition when he opened the 
Oceania Broadcasting Network (OBN), a rival television channel to state-owned TV3 
(which closed in 1993). OBN was operated by members of the Tokaikolo Christian 
Fellowship and broadcast mostly religious programmes. Later, the fellowship 
expanded programming to include news, sport and entertainment shows, and the 
channel became known to many as ‘People’s TV’ because it broadcast views not seen 
on state television. In 2003, Sangster Saulala, the head of OBN, and Tavake 
Fusimalohi, the former head of the Tonga Broadcasting Commission, were accused of 
contempt of court along with three members of the Human Rights and Democracy 
Movement in Tonga (a grouping of pro-democracy advocates formed in 1998) 
following a debate run by OBN questioning legality of the ban imposed Taimi ’o 
Tonga (Reporters without Borders, 2003; Pacific Islands Report, 2007). 
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During the 2005 public servants strike, OBN again ran into trouble when it continued 
to air the views of strike leaders, several of whom were also pro-democracy 
advocates. In 2006, on heels of the Nuku’alofa riots, the government closed OBN 
saying it had helped orchestrate the violence. Station head, Sangster Saulala, was 
charged with sedition but later acquitted. Nevertheless, two years after the riots the 
OBN studios remained under army occupation and much of its equipment had been 
destroyed, according to Saulala (RNZ, 2008-c).  
By that time OBN had already lost its place as an alternative news source for Tongan 
viewers. In November 2005 the Tonga Broadcasting Commission (TBC) in 
partnership with Fiji Television began broadcasting 12 channels of Sky Pacific 
Television into the kingdom. This was expanded to 16 channels a year later. This 
expansion did not signal a softening of the government’s determination to control 
content as the TBC continued attempts to muzzle political debate in the run-up to 
2008 elections.  
In June 2007, the TBC announced that all radio and television political reporting was 
on hold. The issue was described as an internal matter by Prime Minister Feleti Sevele 
in Parliament and was related to complaints about accuracy and balance. Eleven 
weeks before the elections, TBC manager 'Elenoa 'Amanaki promised that political 
programmes by candidates would resume subject to “some censorship”. The 
censorship applied only to paid-for and pre-recorded campaign spots by election 
candidates after new internal regulations stipulated these programmes be hosted by a 
TBC staff member and guest panels discuss only predetermined topics. Censorship 
would only be applied to prevent defamation suits ‘Amanaki told reporters:  
“We will censor programmes when they make personal attacks and criticisms 
of other persons or political groups or discuss matters not related to their 
agenda” (Matangi Tonga Online, 2008). 
This explanation had some validity. Personal attacks and unsubstantiated allegations 
against opponents seem a hallmark of Tongan politics and of political reporting. This 
is due to libel laws remaining largely untested in Tongan courts, as well poor training 
of journalists across much of the industry. However, the veracity of the TBC’s 
position was seriously undermined when it sidelined its own staff two weeks out from 
the election and demanded that all coverage be vetted by its board – headed by Prime 
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Minister Sevele – and TBC managers. TBC said the procedure was necessary to 
maintain accuracy, balance and the right of reply, and insisted its own staff were not 
capable of applying such basic journalistic measures. This position seems bizarre 
considering the TBC employs some of the most experienced journalists in the country 
and that it had six months to ensure staff were adequately trained since political 
reporting was initially pulled (RNZ, 2008-a; Islands Business, undated).  
Pesi Fonua, publisher and editor of the Matangi Tonga Online website and head of the 
Tonga Media Council, said the ban would affect election results. The move also drew 
condemnation from the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) and New Zealand 
cabinet minister, Peter Dunne (theage.com.au, 2008). A 2008 US State Department 
human rights report also reported that Tongan media access to parliamentary debates 
had been restricted with the speaker announcing on 3 June that only one reporter from 
the TBC would be admitted into Parliament during debates and only for one hour. The 
print media, meanwhile, had access only to the official minutes, usually published 
several days after Parliament closed (US Department of State, 2009). For daily media, 
these restrictions undermine any sense of timeliness and hence the worth of reporting 
at all. 
Such indirect censorship is still in evidence. As recently as May 2010, Kalafi Moala 
complained the TBC had pulled Taimi Media Network’s Television Tonga 2 Channel. 
The channel was taken off air on 7 May 2010, after he refused to pay the lease for the 
previous two months. Moala confirmed that he owed the government, but blamed the 
TBC for delays caused by the censoring of his programmes. He told Radio New 
Zealand International: 
“We had felt over the last two to three months that they were deliberately 
making us try to fail, in the sense that they increased the censorship. If we had 
programmes that were political of nature… uhh… these were sometimes just 
pulled without our knowledge” (RNZ, 2010-b). 
He added that the channel would be back on air within weeks through a deal struck 
with DigiTV, a private TV channel owned by Ireland-headquartered mobile phone 
company Digicel.  
Distrust of state-owned mainstream media and a perception that it is censored is not 
confined to journalists. Several NGOs spoken to during fieldwork in Tonga for this 
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thesis stated they specifically do not use TBC radio or television programming 
because of perceived censorship. Those that do admitted to practicing self-censorship 
to avoid content being excised by state bureaucrats. Tonga National Youth Congress 
director Vanessa Lolohea said the congress relied on state-run AM radio broadcasts to 
promote its messages to remote island groups. However, the fortnightly broadcasts are 
strictly about projects – no opinion is included in the content to “avoid being 
censored”. By contrast, the monthly newsletter published and distributed by the group 
is where issues affecting Tongan youth are honestly discussed because “it cannot be 
censored” (Vanessa Lolohea, interview 2010).   
Katalina Tohi, the former head of television at TBC, said that while there was no state 
censorship policy, self-censorship was a common practice among state broadcasters 
wary of offending powerful and conservative (often Church) sensibilities (Katalina 
Tohi, interview 2010). Tohi is now co-owner of broadcasting company Broadcom 
with her husband Maka (also a former TBC employee), who operate Radio One on 
the 88.1FM frequency19. Tohi cited an HIV/AIDS awareness programme being 
broadcast on Radio One as an example of what privately owned media could air and 
state radio wouldn’t. This was not because state radio avoided HIV/AIDS, rather it 
refused to discuss it openly. She explained that even basic terms, such as condom, 
were never uttered by state broadcasters for fear of upsetting conservative listeners. 
Instead, euphemisms such as “adequate protection” were used. She said the result was 
that listeners tuned out, missing important health information (ibid).  
While still an employee of TBC Tohi told Australian radio in 2006 that self-
censorship was common among the news media following the November riots, 
although she again denied there was direct government censorship of news items:  
“The journalists and the people in the media [acting] as gatekeepers are now 
more cautious of what to give the people because otherwise, you know, it may 
                                                
19 In December 2010 Radio One was ordered off air by the Ministry of Information because the Tohis 
were unlicensed. In fact, the license for 88.1FM was owned by Kalafi Moala’s media company, TMN 
Ltd, which had leased the license to the Tohis since 2009. Katalina Tohi claimed the closure was 
political after the station was accused of inciting audiences against MPs who might have voted against 
the Democratic Party in parliamentary elections for a new Prime Minister. Moala cut ties with 
Broadcom over the complaints leaving Radio One without a license. Broadcom then complained it had 
been waiting for two yeas for a license of its own from government. On February 1, 2011, Broadcom 
was granted a license to broadcast on 89.5FM. (Ministry of Information and Communications, 2011)  
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be some reports may provoke a repetition of these November 16 incidents” 
(Australia Network, 2007).  
 
Journalism training 
Former journalist and current head of the Women and Children Crisis Centre, 
‘Ofakilevuka (‘Ofa) Guttenbeil-Likiliki, said that rather than overt government 
control, a major challenge for her is to change traditional attitudes held by journalists 
on issues such as gender. She is involved in journalist training, which she uses to 
“sensitise” students.  
“It’s not just [teaching them about] violence, it’s about economic freedom for 
women, land tenure. It’s about teaching standards, to look at other issues 
beyond the immediate ones of violence” (‘Ofakilevuka (‘Ofa) Guttenbeil-
Likiliki, interview 2010).   
Training for journalists is also an issue for Filokalafi Akau’ola, editor of the Talaki 
newspaper. He employs staff directly from high school, but admitted there was only 
so much on-the-job training he could provide. He thought that a natural inclination for 
Tongan reporters was to protect sources out of deference, family ties or simply 
because “everyone knows everyone” in such a small nation. This means informants 
are less likely to be named in stories or directly quoted. This seriously affects the 
veracity of stories and leaves editors open to charges that stories are untrue. 
(Filokalafi Akau’ola, interview 2010).  
These issues are related to a lack of experience and training. Vikilani (2010) quoted 
Pesi Fonua, Matangi Tonga Online publisher and head of the Tonga Media Council: 
“The biggest threat to medeia freedom in Tonga at the moment is the media 
itself, simply because it has not raised the standard of journalism in the 
country…” (p 77).  
Robie (2008) also confirms that few Pacific journalists provide adequate background, 
research or context to make sufficient sense of a news or current affairs development.   
Despite the embarrassing back downs endured by the government in 1996 and 2003, 
it seems a desire for complete control of the media is never far from the surface. As 
recently as July 2010, the Minister of Information and Communication, ‘Eseta 
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Fusitu‘a, admitted on Tongan television that legislation was being prepared to 
regulate the print media in much the same way as government polices controlled 
broadcast media (Pacific.Scoop, 2010). 
 
Relevance to development communication 
How then does the state of the news media – good or bad – impact on development 
initiatives and development communication? Explaining that Tonga’s media was once 
predominantly owned by the state and Church, Moala relates how almost-always-
government-friendly news reports covered up corruption, failures and scandals 
leaving the public to suffer from “not knowing what happens” (Papoutsaki and Harris, 
2008). This state of general ignorance impacts on the work of NGOs. As previously 
stated, an effective mainstream news media acts as a watchdog, exposing dishonesty, 
abuse of power and ineptitude. But just as important are the less tangible effects of a 
vibrant media – enlivened public debate fostered by an active and informing media. 
This results in a heightened sense of accountability and vigilance among politicians, 
public bodies and community members (Singh, 2004).  
It is easy to see that where the news media does not carry out its ‘watchdog’ 
functions, communities are far more likely to be ignorant of corruption in their midst, 
have a reduced sense of their own relative poverty (or wealth), feel detached from the 
community and uninformed of events in the wider world. Where this is the case, 
development agencies intending to work with that community will have to fill that 
information void to some extent. In the Tongan case, one NGO felt compelled to 
increase awareness among remote island community members of government plans to 
change the electoral system in time for the community to lodge submissions on the 
proposal. Behaviour change campaigns may also include general knowledge content. 
For example, health-related messages will need to explain the consequences of certain 
behaviours in order to ‘persuade’ the audience to choose the desired options.   
The very act of informing audiences – of increasing knowledge – can engender 
greater individual and community militancy for change, e.g. education campaigns on 
reproductive rights in Peru that questioned existing gender roles, as cited in chapter 
three. This in turn may stimulate an increased sense of empowerment and ownership 
among community members.  
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Where mainstream media is not effective or perceived to be compromised, 
communities are less likely to trust the messages they carry. This was confirmed by 
Tongan NGOs, which stated that they tailor messages to suit the format being used, or 
do not use some media at all. For NGOs, understanding which newspapers, 
broadcasters or other media are trusted by target populations could save time and 
resources and increase the impact of their communication initiatives.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter is divided into two parts, with the first providing an overview of Tonga’s 
political system in order to place subsequent, on-the-ground research into context. A 
basic knowledge of political structures at national and local levels will provide greater 
insight into how and why Tongan communities operate they way they do. This will go 
some way to explaining the socio-political mechanisms that perpetuate poverty and 
identify some of the actors that have an interest in stalling calls for change. The 
section also detailed the rise of the democracy movement, including initial results of 
the historic 2010 General Election held under an amended constitution. This election 
was the culmination of decades of popular demands for change and for the first time 
promised the majority of Tongans an opportunity to take control of their own affairs. 
This too could have repercussions for agencies working in Tonga down the track. 
The second part of this chapter discussed Tonga’s mainstream media and provides the 
link from politics to development. The media, especially the news media, plays a 
significant role in both the political and development realms, informing the 
population, and ensuring that both politicians and development agencies are held 
accountable for their activities by acting as a community ‘watchdog’. This feeds into 
wider development efforts to improve governance and thereby boost the effectiveness 
of aid. Where the media is seen to be biased or ineffective, its ability to increase 
transparency is seriously compromised in the eyes of the community. Development 
agencies should be aware of these perceptions in order to better mould their own 
development communication strategies.  
The following chapter will background the NGOs that took part in this research 
before information in this and the previous chapters is used in an analysis of their 
activities.   
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Chapter five: NGO case studies 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the background, aims and project focus 
areas of the Tongan non-government organisations studied for this thesis. MORDI 
Tonga was the primary case study and provided numerous opportunities for 
interviews, either with MORDI staff or with recipients of development activities. 
Other NGOs provided varying levels of input, but all provided valuable insights into 
development activities and development communication in Tonga. 
  
MORDI Tonga 
MORDI stands for Mainstreaming of Rural Development Innovations and is an 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) initiated organisation.  
IFAD, an agency of the United Nations, was established as an international financial 
institution in 1977 and was created following the 1974 World Food Conference. A 
central insight to come from that conference was that food insecurity is more closely 
tied to structural, poverty-related problems than to issues of poor food production. As 
a result, IFAD focuses on country-specific solutions, working with the rural poor, 
governments, donors, non-governmental organisations and others to address structural 
issues. Solutions include increasing access to financial services, markets, technology, 
land and natural resources. 
IFAD’s presence in Tonga dates back to 1983 when it supported three projects in 
association with the Tonga Development Bank, distributing loans of US$6.3 million. 
In 2003 Tonga was included in an IFAD sub-regional strategy that introduces 
development innovations in selected poor rural communities throughout Pacific Island 
nations. Development of agriculture and rural sectors in the outer islands is a 
cornerstone of IFAD's strategy in these countries. This strategy includes parts of 
Melanesia and the remote outer islands of Polynesia and Micronesia, all of which are 
experiencing increasing hardship among their rural poor. 
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In June 2004, IFAD supported a regional workshop in Apia, Samoa that attracted 
representatives from a range of Pacific NGOs and the private sector. The aim was to 
identify key factors that impede development of isolated rural Pacific communities. 
As a result, the MORDI programme itself was developed late in 2004 with the 
Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific International (FSPI) as executing 
agency and IFAD as the major donor. MORDI is overseen by a project steering 
committee made up of major regional NGOs. The aim of the programme is to 
contribute to sustainable, improved livelihoods of vulnerable communities, especially 
youth and women, living in remote rural areas of Pacific Island countries. These 
efforts are guided by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals adopted in 
2000. MORDI currently operates in Fiji, Tonga and Kiribati, but plans to extend 
operations to the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and 
Timor-Leste by the end of 2011. 
In Tonga, the aim of MORDI is to build capacity in target communities, but also to 
help fund projects. MORDI Tonga helps communities develop local capacity by 
recruiting Community Facilitators from within the community. These facilitators then 
help communities draw up their own priority development lists and associated action 
plans. Next, MORDI Tonga assists communities to implement these plans through 
objective assessments, providing specific training and helping to access  
donor funding.  
MORDI Tonga changed from being a Programme to an NGO in its own right in 2009. 
Soane Patolo, MORDI’s general manager, explained this was to enable it to apply for 
donor funding independently of FSPI and IFAD. NZAID is now a primary donor. The 
Catholic Women’s League (CWL) – Tonga, the Tonga National Youth Congress 
(TNYC), and the Civil Society Forum Tonga are three local NGO partners for 
MORDI Tonga.  
Due to its own capacity and funding constraints, MORDI Tonga limits its activities to 
three districts within Tonga. The criteria used to select these areas are: 
• Being among the poorest 25 per cent of all communities in Tonga 
• Remoteness with limited external access (but not so limited MORDI itself 
cannot access it) 
• Receiving little support form other NGOs or donors 
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• Demonstrated self-reliant behaviour 
• A leadership well disposed to the MORDI approach.  
The three areas are the Lulanga District in the island group of Ha’apai, the Motu 
district within the Vava’u group, and communities on the island of Niuafo’ou.  
 
Women and Children Crisis Centre (WCCC). 
Founded in October 2009, the Women and Children Crisis Centre (WCCC) works to 
eliminate all forms of violence against women and children, to promote the human 
rights of women and children and to promote gender equality. 
Prior to 2009, all WCCC staff were employed at the Tonga National Centre for 
Women and Children (TNCWC), an organisation with similar aims to the WCCC, but 
with a governing board largely controlled by government representatives. Over the 
years staff at TNCWC became frustrated at what they saw as an inability to fulfil their 
role as a non-government organisation. They grew frustrated that strategies developed 
by staff were often in direct contrast with views held by government representatives, 
who held the balance of power in the TNCWC decision-making process and blocked 
certain activities. In 2009, staff decided to break away and form their own NGO and 
established the WCCC.  
The organisation operates a safe house, provides 24-hour counselling, legal advice, 
financial advice, women and girl empowerment, male advocacy, and community 
outreach and awareness programmes. In 2010, it dealt with 354 clients seeking help. 
The WCCC partners with numerous organisations, including the Tonga Police 
Domestic Violence Unit, the Ministry of Health, Salvation Army, Life Line and 
Tonga National Youth Congress.  
In December 2010, the WCCC won the Human Rights Award for advancing 
gender equality in the Pacific from the Regional Rights Resource Team and the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Counsel. The co-ordinator of the WCCC is ‘Ofakilevuka 
(‘Ofa) Guttenbeil-Likiliki, who has a background in film, television, communications 
and journalism.  
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Tonga National Youth Congress (TNYC). 
The Tonga National Youth Congress is focused on the interests of youth and was 
founded in 1991 with the support of Churches and the Tongan government. Its goal is 
to improve the welfare of youth in the Kingdom of Tonga through programmes that 
foster responsibility, citizenship, community service and leadership. It is staffed by 
Tongans and local and overseas volunteers. The current TNYC director is Vanessa 
Lolohea. Her background includes a degree in biochemistry gained in Australia, 
before returning to Tonga to work for a company exporting vanilla. She then worked 
two years for the Peace Corps before joining the youth congress in 2008.  
The head office is in Nuku’alofa, but there are also local offices in each of the island 
groups of ’Eua, Ha’apai, Vava’u, Niuatoputapu and Niuafo’ou. The six offices are all 
independent organisations with their own governance arrangements and financial 
management. They come together under the banner of TNYC, and the management of 
the central TNYC office. Local congress co-ordinate youth activities for member 
village youth groups and provide community and social activities. Three of the island 
congress and the National Office also carry out income generation work. The 
organisation as a whole receives project funding from a range of donors. TNYC 
programmes include the Tonga National Volunteers Service, Pacific Stars Lifeskills, 
Youth Parliament, Future Farmers of Tonga, HIV/AIDS and gender development, the 
Environment Committee, and micro-finance initiatives.  
The TNYC media team produces Le'o E Kaha'u (Voice of the Future) magazine to 
provide youth an opportunity to voice their opinions and read about youth issues. It 
also acts as a training ground for writing, design and magazine production. According 
to Lolohea, the magazine fulfils a valuable role, as it is free of government 
censorship, unlike radio programmes the organisation broadcasts via state-owned AM 
radio stations.  
TNYC conducted surveys of Tongan youth in 1998, 2001 and 2007 aimed at 
informing the organisation of the main issues concerning young people and whether 
the organisation’s programmes are having an impact on youth. These surveys form 
the basis for new projects.  
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Tonga Community Development Trust (TCDT).  
Tonga Trust, as it is informally known, started from the work of the Catholic Village 
Women’s Development Programme (VWD) in 1978. The organisation was formally 
registered in November 1983 under the name Foundation for the Peoples of the South 
Pacific/Tonga (FSP Tonga). Two years later, the name of the organisation was 
changed to Tonga Community Development Trust. Since its inception, the 
organisation has been governed by a Board of Directors with day-to-day management 
by the Executive Director, currently Sione Faka‘osi.  
The TCDT is headquartered on the main island of Tongatapu. Field offices were 
opened in the second largest city of Neiafu on Vava‘u in April 1999, with others 
subsequently opened on the Ha‘apai and ‘Eua island groups.  
The TCDT has a long history of development projects based on community needs, 
established through community consultation. The TCDT focuses on capacity building 
with special attention given to the least developed and most disadvantaged 
communities. Projects cover family and community health; rural water supply and 
sanitation; sustainable development; environmental conservation; disaster 
preparedness; women’s development; human rights; good governance, civic education 
and voter education. Specific projects undertaken include, Pesticides Awareness and 
Sustainable Agriculture (PASA), Project, Awareness Community Theatre (ACT), 
People and Policy Project (PPP), and Disaster Preparedness Strengthening Project 
(DPSP). 
 
Tonga Family Health Association (TFHA) 
The Tonga Family Health Association was established by a group of volunteers in 
1975 as the Tonga Family Planning Association. Its primary role was to promote and 
provide integrated family health services to the people of Tonga. In 1983 its focus 
shifted to provide quality family planning services at a grassroots level. Now the 
TFHA provides knowledge, information and education on family planning and sexual 
health to communities, targeting vulnerable populations, especially the poor, 
marginalised and at risk.  
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TFHA clinics on Tongatapu, Ha’apai and Vava’u provide general and specialised 
counselling services, management of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), antenatal 
care, family planning, maternal and gender health, child health and general health 
care. The clinics are of a drop-in type where confidentiality is stressed and a special 
emphasis placed on encouraging youth access. TFHA runs a community-based 
service, the Family Life Education Worker programme, which provides contraceptive 
information and services that fit within local cultural constraints. This requires that 
someone known and trusted by the villagers provides information and contraceptives 
discretely. There are 32 workers who receive monthly training from TFHA staff on a 
range of sexual and reproductive health issues, including HIV/AIDS in the Pacific.  
A central focus of TFHA is increasing awareness of adolescent health issues, youth 
empowerment, and preventing HIV/AIDS. A key educational tool used is the Fili 
Tonu Drama Group, part of the TFHA’s Adolescent Reproductive Health project. Fili 
Tonu translates as ‘right choice’. The group performs in schools and at community 
events, exploring youth issues, such as drinking, obesity, violence, peer pressure and 
sexual health. The group also performs to raise the profile of the Tonga Family Health 
Association.  
 
Langafonua 'a Fafine Tonga.  
Langafonua 'a Fafine Tonga was launched by Queen Salote, who established the 
organisation to promote and enhance the social, cultural, economic and spiritual 
development of Tongan women and their families.  
Recently, Langafonua 'a Fafine lost its preferential position within government and as 
a result has lost funding and the input to other NGOs. It has not had projects funded 
by donors for two years (as of September 2010). This is blamed by Langafonua 'a 
Fafine leadership on politics and a falling out with government over welfare 
initiatives.  
Its offices are housed in a prime colonial building on the main street of Nuku'alofa  – 
Taufa’ahau Rd. This also houses the Langafonua Handicraft Centre (LHC), which 
was established as a non-profit organisation in the 1960s. In 2010, management 
agreed that the LHC should become the business arm of Langafonua ‘a Fafine as a 
profit-making enterprise, while maintaining its original philosophy of assisting the 
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women of Tonga. This business is now the main source of income for the organisation 
with much of the profit going towards upkeep of the building. The leadership hopes 
that by making the organisation a profitable business, it will be less reliant on 
government patronage and can evolve to be of greater benefit to women. All staff are 
volunteers.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided details on the background, aims and primary focus areas of 
the Tongan NGOs studied for this thesis. There were other sources of information 
used in the following analysis section, specifically the beneficiaries of MORDI 
projects and community leaders on the remote island of Hunga. Tongan government 
officials were also interviewed, as were numerous Tongans not directly involved in 
development projects. Some of these were little more than casual conversations and 
not recorded; however, all interactions helped paint a vivid picture of the challenges 
NGOs experience working in Tonga.  
The next chapter will analyse the information gathered during interviews with the 
above organisations and their recipients, and with government officials and local 
development experts.  
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Chapter six: Analysis  
 
Introduction 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to identify successful communication strategies 
used by development agencies working within Tonga’s unique media, cultural and 
political landscape. This chapter analyses information gathered from NGOs working 
in Tonga. It places those experiences within the wider development context, looking 
first at diffusion and then participatory approaches to development and development 
communication. From there, important secondary themes are addressed. These are:  
• Ownership and how this is built within a target community 
• The necessity of face-to-face communication within Tonga’s oral culture 
• The central role played by the Town Officer, and 
• The evolution of kava clubs as a progressive communication and 
organisational forum.  
The primary NGO case study used in this chapter is MORDI Tonga. Other NGOs 
detailed in the previous chapter, are also cited, as are the views of non-NGO experts. 
While all the NGOs used as case studies in this research delivered participatory-style 
activities, methods taken from both diffusion and modernisation paradigms are also 
evident in some projects, depending on their specific objectives. Whatever the 
ideological roots of the methods deployed, all activities included a strong 
communications component, as would be expected from essentially participatory 
development activities. As Gumucio-Dagron (2009) argued: communication is 
participatory development and one cannot occur without the other.  
This chapter will demonstrate that mass media forms of communication – radio, 
television and newspapers – are used and are considered to be helpful in 
disseminating new ideas and initiating change in Tongan communities. However, the 
island nation’s oral culture means that face-to-face communication remains the most 
effective means of exchange. This is as true for the comparatively well-developed 
island of Tongatapu as it is for the remote islands where access to mass media is poor 
to non-existent.  
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DIFFUSION  
The diffusion model is an intermediate step between the polar opposites of 
modernisation and participation. Like modernisation, diffusion espouses an 
essentially one-way transmission of information. But unlike modernisation theory, 
which unquestioningly relies on the mass media to disseminate messages to provoke 
behavioural change, diffusion recognises that the influence of mass media is limited. 
Diffusion theorists recognised that interpersonal communication instead plays a far 
more significant role in the adoption of new ideas (Rogers, 1983; Inagaki 2007). 
Nonetheless, diffusion theorists, like modernisation advocates, regard behaviour 
change as the goal of any communication campaign whether to change an undesirable 
behaviour or encourage the adoption of a new one. This is achieved by providing new 
ideas and information that persuade individuals to adjust behaviour.  
A UNESCO-funded HIV/AIDS radio awareness campaign is one example of a 
diffusion model, mass media development activity conducted in Tonga. Broadcast on 
a privately owned Broadcom radio station, Radio One FM 88.1, the show ran for half 
an hour during the evenings Monday to Friday. Broadcom co-owner and station 
manager Katalina Tohi said the show had proven successful because it “spoke” to the 
target audience (Tongan youth) in their language, using slang terms and raising issues 
older generations might feel were taboo. A phone-in segment encouraging listeners to 
call up with their own questions about sexual health issues had been especially 
popular and proved how effective the show was she claimed. 
This radio show epitomizes later diffusion theory thinking. While it uses mass media 
to produce a specific change in behaviour, it acknowledges that this cannot be 
achieved through a simple, one-way transference of information. The radio show 
format, especially the phone-in segment, was designed to create discussion between 
listeners, and between listeners and studio experts. It “spoke the language” of the 
target audience, stated Tohi, who added that this sort of radio show was a first for 
Tonga’s young people. As a former employee of state broadcaster, Tonga 
Broadcasting Commission, she confirmed that similar HIV/AIDS campaigns had run, 
but with only limited success. The reason, she claimed, was that basic terms such as 
condom were never used for fear of upsetting powerful conservative groups. Instead, 
euphemisms such as “protection” were used. She said the result was that young 
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people tuned out and missed potentially life-saving health information (Tohi, 
interview 2010). 
The approach adopted by the HIV/AIDS campaign acknowledges the crucial role 
interpersonal communication has in diffusing messages beyond the original 
messenger – in this case studio-based sexual health experts. This is all the more 
important in a culture such as Tonga’s, which is traditionally reticent about discussing 
sexuality and sexual health issues.   
 
PARTICIPATION 
Describing the Participatory Development Approach, Robert Chambers (2005) said 
that each individual and group must themselves puzzle out exactly what they think 
participation should mean and how to give it expression. Chambers stated that what 
constitutes meaningful participation for one culture may be completely different for 
another. It may also be different between certain groups within a community, or even 
between individuals within that group. This is due to the unique conditions and 
aspirations that each individual, group and community must juggle when considering 
development activities intended to forever change their lives.  
Tongans have approached participatory development armed with their own cultural 
and political mores. Interacting with the concepts of empowerment, partnership, 
accountability, active citizenship and ownership, these traditions have produced 
distinctly Tongan expressions of participation. Because communication is such a 
fundamental component of participation (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009), Tongans have also 
established distinct communication methods that are culturally relevant and specific 
to them. These will, of course, evolve as Tongan culture does, and as more people 
gain access to new communication mediums, such as mobile phones and the internet. 
These technology-driven trends can already be glimpsed within the relatively well 
developed main population centre of Tongatapu.  
Majid Rahnema (1990, cited by Leal, 2007) provocatively called participation ‘a 
redeeming saint’ for the development industry. Rather than an endorsement, she 
claimed the industry was more concerned with peripheral details – a paternalistic top-
down approach practiced by development agencies – than with fundamental structural 
problems. In a sense, Rahnema’s assessment could be applied to Tonga. The 
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participatory approach demands a horizontal transfer of information, rather than the 
vertical top-down flow, all to familiar from modernisation and diffusion approaches. 
But Tongan culture is strongly hierarchical, both politically and socially and there lies 
an obvious source of conflict awaiting participatory development activities – one that 
requires a considered communication strategy to mitigate.    
From its inception in 1978, the Tonga Community Development Trust (TCDT) has 
consulted with communities on their needs. It was a participatory approach right from 
the beginning, TCDT executive director Sione Faka’osi stated (Faka’osi, interview, 
2010). Likewise, Emily Esau from the Tonga National Youth Congress remarked that 
consultation is standard practice when establishing local priorities and that dialogue 
forms the basis of community action plans (E Esau, interview 2010).  
Projects conducted by MORDI Tonga represent almost a textbook illustration of the 
participatory approach. In fact, its activities almost exactly mirror a checklist of 
desirable participatory objectives and functions, published by Chambers (2005: p 87). 
Those are: 
• Making known local wishes 
• Generating development ideas 
• Providing local knowledge 
• Testing proposals for feasibility and improving them 
• Increasing the capability of communities to handle their affairs and to control 
and exploit their environment 
• Extracting, developing and investing local resources (labour, finance, 
managerial skills, etc) 
• Promoting desirable relationships between people, especially through co-
operative work. 
Similarly, a 1992 set of participation guidelines drawn up for the World Bank by 
Bhatnagar and Williams is even more succinct (cited by Chambers, 2005; p 104): 
1. Information sharing: people are informed in order to facilitate collective 
individual action 
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2. Consultation: people are consulted and interact with an agency, which can 
then take account of their feedback 
3. Decision-making: people have a decision-making role, which may be theirs 
exclusively, or joint with others, on specific issues of a policy or project 
4. Initiating action: people are proactive and able take the initiative. 
MORDI’s own guiding principals list the adoption of a demand-driven approach for 
deciding community-level development activities; a bottom-up approach to determine 
policy; and the adoption of a ‘learning’ approach for the implementation of the 
programme. In other words, MORDI aims to promote development that is stipulated 
by the communities themselves; that is informed by the communities’ own knowledge 
and experience; and that achieves sustainability through local ownership. Indeed, the 
first guiding principal listed in a MORDI Tonga Information Booklet is: “The need to 
ensure broad ownership at all levels” (MORDI Tonga). This is a term not explicitly 
addressed by Chambers, but it is a concept central to the success of activities 
conducted by MORDI and the other NGOs in Tonga, and implicit within  
participatory projects.  
 
Ownership 
“I have seen many community-level projects and the main failure is ownership. If 
you design a project and there is no ownership there, people lose patience and 
then it will definitely fail” (Soane Patolo, interview 2010).  
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by more than 100 donor and 
developing country governments, multilateral donor agencies, regional development 
banks and international agencies lists ‘a sense of ownership’ as one of five mutually 
reinforcing principles. They are: Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results, 
and Mutual Accountability are the remaining four. The intention of the Paris 
Declaration is to better co-ordinate aid among donors and help developing nations 
take a greater lead in their own national development plans. Despite ownership being 
recognised as central to this effort, there is very little detail contained within the 
document on how ownership would be achieved, or even a definition of ownership.  
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The most signatories could agree on was to:  
• Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national 
development strategies through broad consultative processes.  
• Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented 
operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure 
frameworks and annual budgets.  
• Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other 
development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the 
participation of civil society and the private sector. (OECD, 2005) 
 
The Tongan ownership experience  
At a national level, it is hard to discern just how determined the Tongan government 
has been in implementing Paris Declaration principles and, specifically undertakings 
on ownership. Some independent verification comes via the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS, 2010-a). In its July 2010 report, Tracking the Effectiveness of 
Development Efforts in the Pacific, the PIFS states that Tonga has replaced its run of 
Strategic Development Plans with a more focused planning framework. The report 
then acknowledges that of all the elements contributing to aid effectiveness, 
ownership is one of the hardest to define. However, it adds that formulating a national 
plan is “a strong starting point for establishing ownership of development priorities” 
(p 4), although goes on to say this in itself does not drive political decisions or 
resource allocation. According to the report, international experience shows that 
achieving “active national ownership” of development efforts requires: 
• Mechanisms that help to ensure decisions about development arise from the 
national political debate, through formal and informal processes 
• The ability to translate national priorities into operational costed programmes 
(“prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium 
term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets”) 
• A robust national policy framework on the use of development resources that 
guides budget management and relationships with development partners 
• The ability to generate understanding and commitment in development partners 
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through consistent dialogue (PIFS, 2010). 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to assess how well Tonga has achieved Paris 
Declaration commitments, but if there has been political debate leading to 
development mechanisms (as recommended in the first point above), these have not 
been widely reported to the public. Tongan journalist, and editor of the Taimi o’ 
Tonga and Tonga Chronicle newspapers, Kalafi Moala, stated that reporting of 
development issues is rare. His opinion was that the body charged with keeping the 
population informed – the Ministry of Information – had failed to do its job on this 
important aspect of Tongan affairs. He also complained that development NGOs 
themselves fail to use informal forums. They are too linked to institutions, rather than 
Tonga’s culture of family, extended community and village (Moala, interview 2010). 
That development projects are often driven by donors and elites is a common lament 
in developing countries, states Rodrigues (2008).  
As for the final point above – engaging in “consistent dialogue” with development 
partners – the PIFS itself casts doubt on Tonga’s performance:  
“One of the ways in which developing countries can assert the behaviours 
expected of development partners is by agreement on local versions of 
international agreements ... But neither Tonga nor Tuvalu mentioned them in 
their country reports, suggesting that their practical effects may have been 
limited” (PIFS, 2010: p 7).  
 
So, it seems Tonga has made only tentative progress in establishing ownership of its 
national development agenda. But is this the same ownership that MORDI’s Soane 
Patolo described above?  
Just like the Paris Declaration, the PIFS report does not specifically define ownership. 
It does say the process requires popular input and that it should not be a “technocratic 
exercise”. But the emphasis of the document is weighted in favour of national 
development plans and ‘country ownership’, rather than any popular, grassroots sense 
of the term.  
Buiter (2007) suggests that ‘country ownership’ is a jargon term coined by 
international finance institutions to obfuscate the realities of structural adjustment 
programmes. While those types of programmes may not be directly relevant to Tonga, 
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Buiter asks how any nation can declare it has reached a national consensus on 
development priorities and approaches when even the smallest and most homogenous 
still contains within it groups with diverse needs and a multiplicity of view points? He 
concedes, however, that where institutions for political and economic governance are 
seen to be representative and legitimate, it may be justifiable to claim that these 
‘speak for the country’ or ‘represent the interests of the country’. He qualifies this by 
pointing out that those nations requiring development programmes are most often the 
very ones afflicted by non-representative institutions that are corrupt, poorly led and 
with little civil society participation.  
 
Community ownership 
How then is grassroots or community ownership defined? A community that has a 
sense of ownership over its development implies it also has some input into that 
agenda – that it has ‘participated’ in the formulation and implementation of 
development activities, rather than simply had development to imposed from the 
outside in a classic modernisation approach. That participation plays a role in Tongan 
development should not be surprise: it is widely accepted that all development 
projects now include some participatory elements no matter their ideological 
orientation (Chambers, 2005; Huesca, 2003; Cornish and Dunn, 2009; Morris, 2003) 
and even those organisations more inclined to impose interventions from above – 
international financial institutions, for example – have become cheerleaders of 
participation (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009). But true community participation – and its 
corollary ‘ownership’ – requires more than a consultation process designed to merely 
‘tick the participation box’.  
Some core goals of the participatory approach are to establish active citizenship,20 a 
sense of empowerment, partnership, accountability and ownership. All of these 
concepts and attributes are linked and are complimentary. Without active citizenship 
and community participation, a sense of ownership over the development process 
cannot be achieved (Clarke, 2009; Freire, 1970; Chambers, 2005; Huesca, 2003; 
                                                
20 Active citizenship presupposes a level of community participation and ownership of development 
processes. Sustainable change is unlikely where the target community has not actively participated in 
needs analysis, project identification and design, and monitoring and evaluation. Active citizenship is a 
logical and necessary outcome of community participation, and begets a sense of ownership (Clarke, 
2009). 
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Gumucio-Dagron, 2009; Cornish & Dunn, 2009). This active participation in, rather 
than passive acceptance of, the development process is achieved by involving the 
whole community – firstly, through needs analysis, then project identification and 
design, and ultimately in implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Therefore, 
active citizenship is a logical and necessary outcome of community participation, and 
this results in an all-important sense of ownership (Clarke, 2009).  
Community ownership is a consequence of participatory development – an approach 
that recognises the internal strength of communities themselves and hands as much 
control of the development agenda to the people as possible. This raises collective 
self-esteem, and encourages the community to take responsibility for its own actions 
and future direction. In essence, this is what Paulo Freire stressed in Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed (1970): by raising individual and community critical consciousness 
(conscientisation), a level of buy-in or sense of individual and community ownership 
will be achieved.  
 
How NGOs in Tonga achieve ownership 
NGOs interviewed for this thesis ranked creating a sense of ownership as requisite for 
the success of development projects and programmes. Ownership is achieved by 
working directly with those in the community, and by drafting existing political 
institutions and community organisations into development efforts.  
In the case of MORDI, building community ownership begins with the very first 
contact. Through the Town Officer, MORDI arranges an initial meeting with the 
whole community to explain its aims and approach. Its key message is that the 
programme is the community’s and it is up to the community to dictate what projects 
are undertaken and how quickly they will proceed. Only when the whole community 
has approved the programme will MORDI begin working with it.  
The next priority is to appoint community facilitators. These are individuals selected 
from within the community to liaise directly with MORDI. The community facilitator 
will “stand between them and us, as a bridge for communication” (Patolo, interview 
2010). Those NGOs that use community facilitators provide training on how to run 
meetings, basic governance, creating community action plans and reporting on 
activities. Both MORDI and the TCDT provide training for facilitators with the 
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TCDT specifically training women for women’s groups and youth for youth groups, 
and providing governance training. MORDI holds its community facilitator training 
over two weeks on Tongatapu with all transport and accommodation costs covered  
for participants. 
Tonga Community Development Trust executive director, Sione Faka’osi, stated that 
facilitators are often ex-teachers because they are articulate and experienced 
mediators, respected by the community (Faka’osi, interview 2010). While it is 
ultimately up to the community to select facilitators, the TCDT is careful to avoid 
selections that may be controversial. That is, individuals known to have a bias for or 
against certain sectors of their community. Faka’osi admitted it is difficult to find 
good facilitators – those interested in promoting the whole community, rather than 
family members or favoured groups. He found that those volunteering to be 
facilitators were usually older, established financially and had time to commit to the 
role. While not a paid position, facilitators often receive some form of incentive 
(usually meals supplied during community work).  
Once selected and trained, community facilitators organise a meeting of the whole 
community where a list of development priorities and a plan on how to achieve these 
goals is drawn up. This includes specifying the community’s level of participation – 
what work they will carry out and what level of funding the community will shoulder. 
Development ‘wish lists’ often start off as quite fanciful and may feature demands for 
the latest consumer goods, such as flat screen televisions, but they quickly become 
more realistic as the community adjusts to the new role of deciding its own destiny 
(Patolo, interview 2010). Community development ‘aspirations’ are written onto large 
sheets of paper and hung on the walls of the community hall to act as a constant 
reference and reminder for the community.  
MORDI also undertakes a detailed baseline survey of community assets with the 
number of houses, livestock, inhabitants, plantations, water supplies and other 
relevant data plotted onto a map of the local area. These are shared among residents. 
Like MORDI, TCDT project proposals are formulated through direct engagement 
with the community. These proposals are refined by TCDT representatives, who then 
go back to the community to discuss specific details, such as the community’s level  
of participation.  
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Communication and ownership  
Nearly all the NGOs consulted for this thesis reported that their most important 
communication tools are community meetings and workshops. These can be fonos of 
the whole community or smaller groups discussing specific issues. This face-to-face 
dialogue and feedback process is not dependent on literacy or communications 
infrastructure, thus ensuring the whole community can be included in the 
development process. This familiar and relaxed exchange provides an opportunity for 
facilitators to uncover misunderstandings community members might have.  
This sharing of ideas, or horizontal communication, is a key point of difference that 
distinguishes participation from modernisation and diffusion paradigms. 
Communication approaches related to the latter two stress a paternalistic, top-down 
exchange of information from First World experts to Third World receivers. This 
form of communication cares little whether the entire community is involved, 
believing instead that new ideas will naturally trickle down, or diffuse to the whole 
community once the superiority of those ideas is understood. This trickle-down 
reasoning underpins the diffusion paradigm, which relies upon change ‘champions’ to 
act as agents of change. This approach assumes that communities are homogenous, 
that ideas diffuse unimpeded and fails to recognise that there will be existing elites 
and community, and that these divisions might be exacerbated if not all members 
have equal access to new ideas (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).  
Participation, meanwhile, is predicated upon sharing information equally, or 
horizontally, between stakeholders (NGOs, extension workers, government officials) 
and the community (Bessette, 2006; Inagaki 2007). It is understood that community 
members know best what works for them and their local environment. By tapping into 
this indigenous knowledge, development agencies can better ensure active citizenship 
and local ownership (Clarke, 2009; Chambers, 2005; Huesca, 2003; Gumucio-
Dagron, 2009; Cornish & Dunn, 2009).  
 
Face-to-face communication 
Several reasons were cited by Tongan NGOs to explain the success of, and their 
preference for interpersonal, face-to-face communication over mass media forms. The 
most obvious are physical constraints – a lack of infrastructure and the vast distances 
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that overwhelm the reach of Tonga’s mass media. These are most obvious for remote 
island communities where limited electricity supplies (to power televisions and 
radios) and sporadic boat sailings (to bring newspapers and mail) mean face-to-face 
communication remains the most reliable way to transmit ideas. This does not stop 
the Tongan government or international donor agencies from using mass media to 
announce new initiatives or funding rounds. The now-defunct AUSAid Tonga 
Community Development Scheme was advertised in newspapers and on the radio 
even though a preference was given to schemes in remote islands where mass media 
was unreliable (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, interview 2010).   
NGOs understand that mass media forms, such as newspapers and radio, are also vital 
communication tools, albeit less so in remote communities. Community consultations 
emanating from constitutional reforms in the run-up to the 2010 elections  
demonstrate this:  
“When the government first called for submissions, they announced it on the 
radio. The papers didn’t get to the Niuas [Niuatoputapu and Niuafo'ou islands 
350km north of Vava’u] for about four months. That’s when people in the 
Niuas realised that this was important, because they had more details [from the 
newspaper] (Patolo, interview 2010). 
Patolo’s point is that the immediacy and short life of broadcast messages often means 
they are brief on detail. In this case, the islanders needed more information to fully 
understand the ramifications of electoral reforms. This case also demonstrates the 
potential failings of mass media communications in remote areas, as by the time the 
community made submissions, the process had already closed. 
“You can’t name a specific timeframe for the communities I work with: if 
there’s no transport, if they haven’t been trained on proposal writing, you 
can’t get proposals to stick to the timeframe” (ibid). 
NGOs also find face-to-face communication more effective on Tonga’s main island of 
Tongatapu where distance and poor infrastructure do not impact on the population’s 
ability to access information via the mass media. This preference for interpersonal 
communication – even where other options are available – is something diffusion 
theorists have long been well aware of. Everett Rogers, the father of diffusion theory, 
highlighted this in 1983: 
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“…mass media channels are often the most rapid and efficient means to inform 
an audience of potential adopters about the existence of an innovation, that is, to 
create awareness-knowledge ... On the other hand, interpersonal channels are 
more effective in persuading an individual to adopt a new idea, especially if the 
interpersonal channel links two or more individuals who are near-peers (p 18). 
Interpersonal communication is recognised as hugely important, especially for 
behaviour modification projects such as HIV/AIDS and family planning awareness 
campaigns (ibid). Several studies have shown that interpersonal communications 
between spouses, or among family, friends and neighbours, have greater influence on 
behaviour change than mass media campaigns delivered via newspapers, radio and 
television. That is not to diminish the effectiveness of mass media campaigns entirely: 
they are often a necessary precursor, laying the informational groundwork for 
subsequent campaigns based on interpersonal communication (Inagaki, 2007).  
In Tonga, interpersonal communication is all-the-more-important because, as a 
Pacific culture, the preferred form of communication is oral, rather than written 
(Wrighton, 2010). Adolescent Health and Development project co-ordinator for the 
Tonga Family Health Association, Katherine Mafi confirms this. People prefer to hear 
stories, especially those presented in a humorous way (Mafi, interview 2010). This 
goes some way to explaining the popularity of the Fili Tonu drama group and why it 
has proved such a key promotional tool for the Family Health Association.  
Fili Tonu is a drama group affiliated with the Tonga Family Health Association that 
began in 2000 as part of the Adolescent Reproductive Health project. Fili Tonu, 
which translates to 'right choice' in English, performs at schools and communities and 
explores youth issues such as drinking, obesity, violence, peer pressure and sexual 
health. The group is made up of nine volunteers who write and perform all the shows. 
In theoretical terms, Fili Tonu fits into the ‘folk media’ or ‘entertainment-education’ 
format. This has been used to great effect in areas with limited access to electronic 
media (Snyder, 2003). Fili Tonu members believe humour is especially effective in 
Tonga, which is why they focus on comedy to keep audiences engaged.   
There are also drawbacks to relying so heavily on face-to-face communication. For 
TCDT Vava’u community facilitator, Alaipuke Esau, relying on the Town Officer to 
facilitate face-to-face communication can be problematic, as the Town Officer is not 
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always seen as traditional (the system of representation is only 50 years old). Before 
the Town Officer everyone did what they were told by elders, he stated (A Esau, 
interview 2010).  
TCDT head, Sione Faka’osi, said these attitudes are dying out and a more transparent 
decision-making process based on open community discussion is evolving, eclipsing 
even the role that nobles once monopolised:  
“Once the nobles became aware that this [democratisation] was not a political 
process [of grabbing power], but a governance process, they saw it was 
important for development. They then drove it themselves” (Faka’osi, 
interview 2010).  
 
Ownership through communication 
The remote community of Hunga in Tonga’s Vava’u group community tells a story 
that illustrates disempowerment and a loss of ownership. It began  with the Canada 
Fund providing free concrete water tanks for each home in the community. According 
to Hunga community facilitator ’Alamoti Tautakitaki, the community was initially 
very grateful, as until then everyone relied on one large communal concrete tank 
constructed decades previously, filled from the roof of the community hall. When the 
last of the new tanks was installed, the Canada Fund left. Within a year the tanks 
began to crack. More and more families were forced to get water from intact tanks 
belonging to neighbours. What had started as a significant improvement in water 
supplies became a curse and a potential source of community division. The 
community had no idea the tanks could be easily repaired with fresh cement, 
Tautakitaki explained. Another community member stated that the experience had left 
them feeling bitter and beholden to the Canada Fund like “children”.  
That was not the only time development agencies had provided new facilities for 
Hunga, but had failed to consider ongoing sustainability. A Japanese agency recently 
supplied each home with solar electric panels. Batteries stored power generated 
during the day and then ran household lighting at night. After about a year and once 
community members had grown accustomed to their electric lights, the batteries 
began failing. These were specialised and could not be replaced easily by the 
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community. Eventually, they substituted them with easily obtainable and relatively 
cheap car batteries, discarding the donor batteries altogether.   
But it was the water tank experience that became a touchstone for the community. 
Perhaps it was the simplicity of its solution – the fact that the community already 
possessed the skills and materials required to plug the cracks – and that they had (for 
a time at least) become blind to their own abilities and the potential of their own 
initiative. The water tanks symbolised a level of dependence Hunga had developed.  
“We just waited for the government to tell us what to do. Over time, more 
people were leaving Hunga” (Sione Atu community facilitator, interview 
2010).  
MORDI’s emphasis on engendering a sense of ownership and empowerment plainly 
struck a chord in Hunga when the NGO arrived in the community not long after.  
“The first time MORDI came, we thought they were just like other donors. 
Then they started training community facilitators and working with them 
through the year. This was different. The others never asked us what we 
wanted to do. With MORDI everyone is involved. People started to see real 
things happen.  
“Change is difficult. But with MORDI, they plan something and they start to 
see something change. They are motivated and empowered. We started in 
2007, and it’s only in the last year that we can see the changes in people’s 
attitudes” (Tautakitaki, interview 2010).  
 
MORDI approach 
MORDI Tonga selects the communities it approaches to work with based on six 
criteria: 
1. They should be among the poorest 25 per cent of all communities in Tonga 
2. They should be remote upland or outer island areas with limited external 
access (although not so remote that the programme could not operate 
effectively) 
3. The community receives little support from other donor/NGO programmes 
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4. They should be proactive and have demonstrated self-reliant behaviour 
5. District and village leadership should be supportive of development  
6. Total population should be dense enough to make project delivery cost-
effective. 
Once a community is selected and it agrees to work with MORDI, community 
facilitators are chosen and trained. A detailed survey is also carried out that counts 
houses, livestock, inhabitants, plantations, water supplies and other relevant data, 
which is plotted onto a map of the island. This information is shared among residents. 
The community together draws up its three-year development plan, prioritising certain 
key activities. For the Hunga community, it was agreed the most crucial priority was 
to build a road traversing the cliff to the community jetty. This was the only practical 
access to their boats and their lifeline to the outside world. Other priorities included 
establishing a communal garden and youth job training.  
Another step in the MORDI approach is to encourage greater community involvement 
in the monthly community fono. These are an existing forum held in all Tongan 
communities and are called by the Town Officer. The effectiveness of these 
community fonos varies widely from community to community. Several interviewees 
stated that nobles and other local elites dominated the community fonos. TCDT 
executive director Sione Faka’osi added that the monthly meetings were often poorly 
attended because a small group of community members and families often get re-
elected to committee roles year-in, year-out. Community committees can also be 
guilty of leaving major and difficult decisions to local nobles. The result is that many 
community members become disenchanted with the process and feel powerless 
against entrenched power blocs. This leads to greater apathy and disengagement from 
local decision-making (Faka’osi, interview 2010).  
The residents of Hunga have largely solved the issue of public disengagement by 
devolving decision-making deeper into the community. Rather than leave all 
decisions to the Community Committee or the Town Officer, they have created sub-
committees with each responsible for a certain activity or resource within the 
community. For example, there is a vehicle committee, garden committee, youth 
committee, even the community fence committee. Each sub-committee meets 
monthly to plan its own activities and sends its Secretary and Chair to the monthly 
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Community Committee meeting where they propose those activities. The Community 
Committee can veto sub-committee plans, depending on whether they fit with wider 
community development priorities. 
An example of an activity accepted by the Hunga Community Committee came from 
the vehicle sub-committee. It wanted to build a garage to house the community-
owned tractor and truck, plus tools used to construct the road and used in the 
community garden. This plan was accepted as it complimented the community’s 
three-year plan. Community facilitator ’Alamoti Tautakitaki, who claimed credit for 
the sub-committee idea stated:  
“This way, everyone feels they belong and have a role. They have risen to this 
challenge” (Tautakitaki, interview 2010).   
Even quite simple tasks are controlled by sub-committees. ’Ana Pua is the Chair of 
the women’s committee. The main task of the 28 women and youth in the group is to 
keep the village clean. Each Saturday they visit every home in the community to 
check if they are clean and have secure pigpens. Homes not meeting cleanliness 
standards are fined TOP$2 and if residents do not pay they are ‘named and shamed’ at 
the monthly village fono. People are happy to have the checks, Pua said, and are 
happy that sanitation is looked after.  
Akosita Tu’a is secretary of Hunga youth committee. This committee has 15 members 
aged 14 to 34, and is primarily concerned with creating employment opportunities for 
Hunga youth. Each Monday they undertake volunteer work, cleaning up the beach, 
the village and vacant houses. The group also operates a lawn-mowing business to 
earn money for the group and individual members. For each lawn-mowing job, the 
group takes 40 per cent of the profit while 60 per cent goes to those doing the 
mowing. The committee also raises money by holding concerts and running kava 
clubs (see later explanation of kava clubs). They use these funds for community 
projects such as supplying solar power. Like other committees, it meets once a month 
to come up with new projects.  
Tu’a explained that since MORDI became involved in the community, there had been 
a noticeable change:  
“People are saving their money. The women use their time better with crafts. 
The more money they have, the better. Before they did not have the skills to 
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be self-employed. MORDI conducted financial literacy courses and families 
are now saving money” (Tu’a, interview 2010).  
The above descriptions of development processes and activities are intended to 
demonstrate how community members become direct participants in their own 
development initiatives, even the most mundane tasks. The NGOs involved would 
likely agree with Gumucio-Dagron’s (2009) assessment of the participatory approach:  
“Everybody knows that projects fail when communities are not involved and do 
not take ownership of the social change process; and everybody knows that the 
only real guarantee for sustainability is when people appropriate a programme” 
(p 455-6). 
Communication plays a crucial role enabling that appropriation, participation and 
ownership. Participatory development communication focuses on informing people to 
help change attitudes and facilitate dialogue with stakeholders. The aim is to assist all 
those involved to address common problems by identifying required partnerships, 
knowledge and material conditions to effect change. 
“The focus is not on information to be disseminated by experts to end-users. 
Rather, it is on horizontal communication processes that enable local 
communities to identify their development needs and the specific actions that 
could help to fulfil those needs, while establishing an ongoing dialogue with 
the other stakeholders involved (eg extension workers, researchers and 
decision-makers). The main objective is to ensure that the end-users gather 
enough information and knowledge to carry out their own development 
initiatives, evaluate their actions and recognise the resulting benefits” 
(Bessette, 2006: p 5). 
 
TOWN OFFICER 
A crucial development stakeholder in the Tongan setting is the Town Officer. All 
communities in Tonga elect one of their own to be the government’s representative. 
Very little is written about working with local government authorities in the literature 
covered by this thesis. Where authorities are described, they are invariably part of the 
developmental problem – at best bureaucratic and at worst reactionary, corrupt and 
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oppressive. In Tonga, NGOs have found that gaining the active support of local 
government representatives is crucial for the success of development activities.  
“In every district there is a District Officer – one person to look after one 
whole district. Then in each community there is the Town Officer – just those 
two representing the government. Those two roles are very important for the 
success of MORDI. If we don’t get their support… that’s one of the reasons 
activities fail at the community level” (Patolo, interview 2010). 
Those communities where the Town Officer leads the people – reminding them to 
attend meetings, get reports written and encouraging community members to get 
involved are the ones that perform well in development activities, Patolo states.  
The Town Officer also plays a critical role for the TCDT. Again, he acts as the 
NGO’s contact person in the community, calling community meetings and arranging 
the venue. According to TCDT Vava’u representative Emily Esau, this includes 
selecting those who will participate in meetings, although the NGO does have input 
on participant selection via a list sent through to the Town Officer. TCDT community 
facilitator on the same island, Alaipuke Esau, cautions that Town Officers can also 
have their own agendas and may interfere in projects. The NGO is mitigating this 
issue through the Pacific Leadership Programme, an AusAID initiative based in Fiji. 
This programme attempts to evolve traditional forms of leadership to meet the 
demands of modern societies. 
According to MORDI Hunga community facilitator, ’Alamoti Tautakitaki, the Town 
Officer’s central responsibilities are to maintain peace, and law and order. 
Development was never part of their role:  
“Some are better than others, but they are not required to look at development. 
More often, the Town Officer and the community rely on the government for 
development initiatives” (Tautakitaki, interview 2010).  
For Hunga, this meant proposals went first to the Vava’u governor and then to central 
government. Many proposals had been lodged over the years, Tautakitaki claimed, 
but they never succeeded because they went through government and got bogged 
down in bureaucracy.  
Napa’a Halatanu is the Town Officer for the community on Hunga. Elected in 2004, 
he has been re-elected unopposed in triennial elections ever since. Halatanu sees his 
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role as being a “bridge” between the governor on Vava’u, the Prime Minister’s office 
and the people of Hunga. This duty is performed primarily through the monthly 
community fono where he informs the community of new laws and government 
programmes, and notes community concerns to pass on to relevant authorities. 
MORDI has not attempted to change this side of his role, although other 
responsibilities within the Community Committee have expanded. Each sub-
committee now reports to him and he in turn reports every decision made by those 
committees back to the community during each monthly fono. While this managerial-
type role has grown, decision-making has devolved to the wider community through 
the sub-committees.  
“Before people did not make decisions. With the committee model everyone is 
happy because they can make decisions. Everyone has input and can agree 
with decisions and are responsible for the decisions” (Halatanu, interview 
2010).  
Halatanu also fulfils a vital oversight and accountability function: while each 
committee raises its own funds for development activities, each must also gain the 
Town Officer’s approval to spend that money. This level of oversight is separate to 
evaluations and reviews conducted by donors.  
 
KAVA CLUBS  
A decision-making forum increasingly important for both rural and urban Tongan 
communities is the faikava or kava club. Drinking kava has long been an important 
community ritual for men in Tonga. The more traditional kava circle is usually a 
private, invites-only forum for formal discussion, as well as an avenue for courtship. 
In recent decades, however, a less formal version of the kava circle – the kava club – 
has evolved. These are now a feature in virtually all Tongan communities. Unlike 
kava circles, kava clubs are open to all-comers (as long as they are men) willing to 
contribute to the cost of the kava.  
Beginning not long after nightfall and continuing into the early morning, participants 
of kava clubs talk, sing, play music, play board games and cards, smoke cigarettes 
and, of course, drink kava. Alcohol is not allowed. There is a considerable spread in 
the age of kava club members, unlike kava circles, which are usually reserved for 
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working, family men (those in their late 20s and 30s up). Kava clubs are increasingly 
admitting teenagers, some as young as 15, according to Women and Children Crisis 
Centre male advocacy trainer Usaia Hemaloto.  
Typically, most kava clubs begin as more or less spontaneous gatherings of village 
men who drink kava together to socialise. Initially, this is conducted wherever they 
can – in a church hall, out in the open or at private homes. As they become more 
organised, participants often collect funds among themselves to build a dedicated 
clubroom. Buoyed by this success, fundraising becomes a permanent feature for many 
of the clubs and members turn their attention to wider community projects. Some 
have even spread overseas with chapters established wherever large groups of 
Tongans reside – New Zealand, Australia and the USA. More affluent members of 
overseas chapters may also raise funds for the home club, giving the Tonga-based 
club considerable financial clout within the community. Kava clubs have even 
become a Reality Television phenomena in Tonga. Kava Idol is a variety show 
sponsored by state-owned telecommunications company, TCC, and broadcast live on 
Friday nights. It features community kava club musical and dance groups that 
compete for a TOP$10,000 prize pool.  
 
Kava clubs and development communication  
Few development activities are pure examples of any one theoretical approach, 
whether they be modernisation, diffusion or participatory models. Most are a mixture 
using a combination of communication techniques. Women and Children Crisis 
Centre male advocacy trainer, Usaia Hemaloto, mixes diffusion and participatory 
approaches to raise awareness about family violence. His main task is to raise 
awareness about gender issues among men and especially the high incidence of 
family violence in Tonga. His primary medium is the kava club. He states that within 
the clubs, he can talk face-to-face with a wide cross section of men in a venue where 
all participants feel comfortable and unencumbered by traditional concerns over 
hierarchy.  
Normally, he simply drops in on a kava club unannounced. The evening gatherings 
often last until 4am or later, giving Hemaloto ample time to become accepted by the 
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group. He normally first discusses general topics, such as fishing, the plantation or 
politics, then raises the issue of family life:  
“Not everyone wants to discuss fishing or is interested in politics. But 
everyone has a family life and can contribute. I am only raising awareness. I 
do this all the time. I ask them, ‘Who is looking after the family while you are 
at the kava club every night for hours’. 
“I can talk with a rich man, an educated man, a noble or a poor fisherman on 
equal terms. Everyone is equal. You can talk about issues you do not hear 
about elsewhere” (Hemaloto, interview 2010).  
This highly targeted and orchestrated form of interpersonal communication is more 
effective for Hemaloto than other mass media options. While radio, television and 
newspapers might have a broader reach it is difficult to assess how well target 
audiences receive messages with this mass media, scattergun approach. On the one 
hand, Hemaloto’s kava club method is an example of diffusion; its aim is to modify 
behaviour (in this case to reduce violence against women), but does not rely on an 
orchestrated mass media campaign to get this message across. On the other hand, the 
fact Hemaloto interacts directly with his audience on an equal footing using a 
horizontal (rather than top-down) form of communication, gives this a distinctly 
participatory flavour.   
In one sense kava clubs are very traditional in that they are strictly male domains, 
however, they are distinctly modern in other aspects. For example, the strict social 
hierarchies and faka’apa’apa (culture of deference) that remains such a feature of 
Tongan society does not bind kava club members so strongly. As Hemaloto states 
above, at the kava club he can speak as an equal to nobles and fishermen alike. This 
relatively egalitarian forum seems not to be replicated anywhere else – at least, not on 
such a scale.  
The rapid growth and penetration of kava clubs into all corners of Tongan society and 
the fact these have often evolved into much more then simple social organisations can 
be seen as a grassroots expression of the growing desire for community-led 
development. Plainly, traditional institutions – nobles, central and local government, 
and the Church – have failed to adequately meet this desire leaving a vacuum that 
kava clubs have filled.  
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Kava clubs rely upon face-to-face communication as the primary development 
communication medium. This is as true as for clubs in remote areas as it is for those 
in the relatively infrastructure-rich regions such as Tongatapu and Vava’u where 
access to mass-media options is not an issue for NGOs. Because of their ubiquity and 
the unparalleled access kava clubs give to community members (albeit male), it would 
be wise for any development organisation planning to work with Tongan communities 
to consider kava clubs as an important communication option. This is especially 
relevant where mass-media alternatives are unavailable.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the importance of ownership in the Tongan development setting was 
explored. NGOs working in Tonga stated that instilling a sense of ownership among 
target communities is a key determinant for the success of development activities. But 
creating a sense of ‘community ownership’ is not the same as ‘country ownership’, a 
stated objective of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Creating a sense 
of community ownership is achieved in part by deploying effective development 
communication strategies. In the Tongan case, this is primarily accomplished via 
face-to-face, verbal communication, although mass media mediums are also used to a 
lesser degree.  
Empowerment and active citizenship are inextricably linked to the concept of 
ownership and these are essential elements for successful participatory development 
projects, a development methodology employed by the NGOs studied. Mechanisms 
and communication strategies deployed by NGOs studied in Tonga to encourage 
active citizenship and a sense of ownership were also outlined. Again, these are 
essentially participatory approaches, primarily reliant on verbal communication. This 
approach fits well with Tonga’s oral culture. This makes related fields of development 
communication, such as folk media or entertainment-education as practiced by the 
Fili Tonu theatre group, particularly effective among Tongan audiences.  
Tongan NGOs are well aware of the need to use existing political and cultural 
structures to promote development agendas. The District and Town Officers, central 
government’s elected representatives in every Tongan district and community, are 
indispensable for the success of development projects. NGOs stated that the level of 
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support these government representatives demonstrated towards community 
development had a direct impact on the immediate and long-term success of activities. 
In the community of Hunga, the primary case study for this thesis, the Town Officer 
was a central player in development activities. His participation in the community’s 
development programme changed his own role, devolving many of his decision-
making responsibilities out to the wider community. The net effect was that while 
there were more decisions to be made as a result of development initiatives, his own 
workload had reduced and he was happier with this role.  
Another indigenous organisation used by development agencies is the kava club. This 
relatively new social phenomenon has become a potentially important communication 
conduit for NGOs, offering almost unparalleled ease of access to community 
members. While strictly a male domain, kava clubs are not subject to the same 
hierarchical rules that dominate almost every facet of Tongan society – nobles and 
commoners, rich and poor, young and old mix freely at kava clubs without strict rules 
enforcing traditional deference to social and political superiors. This affords NGOs a 
unique opportunity to communicate face-to-face with a community’s male population 
– a group that still wields most of the decision-making responsibilities in Tongan. 
Local politicians and NGOs have been quick to recognise the value of kava clubs as a 
communication tool. The Women and Children Crisis Centre uses them extensively to 
promote its non-violence message to men, while the Tonga Community Development 
Trust and Tonga National Youth Congress also use them when appropriate.  
In the next chapter, all facets of research and analysis used in this research are drawn 
together to form four key conclusions. This chapter will address key concepts related 
to participatory development, mainstream media, local and national government and 
emerging grassroots forums. There will also be discussion around the relevance of 
ownership to development projects and the role of the Church in Tonga.  
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Chapter seven: Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined communication strategies used by NGOs working in the 
Kingdom of Tonga. The aim is to uncover and highlight communication strategies – 
with particular reference to the mainstream media – that had proven effective in 
achieving development goals. It is hoped these lessons might be applied to better 
deliver development initiatives.  
As a first step this thesis investigated wider debate on the role of communication in 
development. This revealed a rich academic discourse known broadly as development 
communication. Three theoretical threads dominate this area of study: modernisation, 
diffusion and participatory communication methodologies. These approaches mirror 
wider development industry debate, and also tackles related issues, such as gender 
and globalisation.  
Next, the current state of Tonga’s political and mass media environments were 
examined. This chapter first gave a précis of Tonga’s unique political history since 
the newly unified nation became a Constitutional Monarchy under King George 
Taufa’ahua Tupou I in 1875. A special focus was kept on the growth of Tonga’s 
democracy movement, culminating in the landmark 2010 General Election held under 
an amended constitution. The evolution of Tonga’s mass media, especially its news 
media, is closely related to Tonga’s political trajectory, and both have implications for 
development agencies initiatives undertaken in the country. Providing readers some 
background on Tonga’s political and media climates was seen as vital in placing 
subsequent research and analysis sections into context.  
In-country research undertaken for this thesis, detailed in Chapter six, involved 
numerous semi-structured interviews with NGO staff and recipients of development 
initiatives. These interviews were conducted over four weeks in August and 
September 2010, mainly on the island of Tongatapu, but also on two islands in the 
Vava’u group. The primary case study is MORDI Tonga, an NGO affiliated to UN 
agency IFAD. Gathering information for that case study included travelling to the 
remote island of Hunga as a guest of MORDI and spending three days interviewing 
community members about their experiences of development. Finally, Tongan 
government officials from the Ministry of Finance; and Ministry of Agiculture, Food, 
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Fisheries and Forestry were interviewed, as were in-country representatives of donor 
agencies, AusAID and NZAID.  
 
An assumption dashed 
The original underlying purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the central role 
mainstream media plays in the development process. The assumption was that 
without an effective, unfettered and pluralistic media (read: news media), 
development initiatives could not reach their full potential. They would be poorer 
without the media for being less transparent, less accountable, less informed and, 
ultimately, less effective.  
The in-country research did not support that assumption. Thankfully, something far 
more compelling than yet another treatise on the democratising, but fundamentally 
non-challenging, power of mainstream media was revealed. I discovered that far from 
being a crucial actor on the Tongan development stage, mainstream media takes more 
of a backseat role. Yes, it has a part to play, and without mainstream media, 
development initiatives are rendered two-dimensional with less credibility. That is, 
without the publicity and transparency that media attention brings, development 
initiatives become an exclusive dialogue between providers and recipients. For those 
outside that dialogue, development is far less tangible – it is something that occurs in 
another place to other people.  
What this research did establish is that face-to-face communication is a far more 
powerful development actor in Tonga. Nearly all the NGOs interviewed agreed that 
sitting down as equals with aid recipients to discuss community needs, possible 
solutions and how these might be achieved was one of the most important 
determinants for short and long-term success of development activities. Mainstream 
media is in the mix, they agreed, but it sits beside other development actors, such as 
the Church, local government or external forces like globalisation, in importance.  
 
As suggested, this research did uncover factors that have considerable influential on 
the success of development initiatives deployed in the Tongan setting. Those factors 
can be summarised under four main headings: 
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1. Communication: Face-to-face communication remains the most useful and 
persuasive medium in Tonga. This is partly due to the uneven coverage and 
unreliability of communications infrastructure limiting the reach of mass 
media forms, but is primarily due to Tonga possessing a largely oral culture 
that values human interaction over other forms of communication.  
2. Ownership: Truly participatory projects – that is, those that do more than 
merely tick the consultation box – must enlist local input and engender a sense 
of ownership among communities if they hope to achieve both short term and 
sustained success. Creating an open, respectful, horizontal dialogue with 
communities is essential in creating that sense of ownership.  
3. Town Officer: While local and national government institutions have been 
eclipsed to some degree by development organisations, community 
development activities still depend for their success upon the support of the 
Town Officer. This elected official remains an organisational linchpin in most 
communities responsible for calling monthly community meetings (fonos) and 
often deciding what activities will be undertaken and who will be involved.  
4. Kava clubs: In many communities across Tonga, faikava, or kava clubs have 
evolved from essentially being social clubs into key grassroots community 
organisations. Kava clubs not only function as discussion forums, they are 
organising committees, centres for fundraising and a comparatively classless 
alternative to more traditional institutions, such as the Church or  
community fonos.  
 
These key findings will now be discussed in further detail. I then think it appropriate 
to make special mention of the Church in Tonga, as this is an existing powerful 
institution that has considerable potential to influence change within the country.   
 
Communication  
Since Daniel Lerner’s “passing of traditional society” thesis (1958), the mass media 
has been a favourite tool for the delivery of development-related messages. Its most 
basic function is to inform communities about development activities, such as the 
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construction of roads, new funding rounds, legislation changes and so on. But using 
the mass media to communicate development-related messages can also be a 
development activity in and of itself. This is particularly true of campaigns that 
advocate changes in behaviour or seek to raise awareness of an issue. These advocacy 
campaigns can cover a plethora of messages, but are most often associated with 
health-related issues, such as family planning, nutrition or the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. In the case of HIV/AIDS, as Mody and Wilkins (2001) pointed out, the 
use of mass media takes centre stage: “Information campaigns are the only 
immunization possible until a vaccine is invented” (p 387). 
A crucial first step in this investigation was to assess the state of Tonga’s mass media, 
especially the news media. Despite a widely held perception that the Tongan 
government tightly controls the mainstream media, the contemporary reality is quite 
different. Four privately owned, competing newspapers are published weekly on 
Tongatapu (home to more than 70 per cent of the population). Several niche 
periodicals are also published by church groups and the public service union, as well 
as by NGOs such as the Tonga National Youth Congress. There is also a mix of 
private and state-owned radio and television broadcasters with varying levels of reach 
into the other islands groups. These island groups are Ha’apai, Vava’u and the Niuas. 
Of these Vava’u has the best access to mainstream media because it is home to 
Tonga’s second largest city, Neiafu. It is also the main destination for tourists in 
Tonga and is consequently well served by telecommunications, airlines and  
sea transport.  
Beyond Neiafu, however, transport is irregular and small-scale consisting mainly of 
private boats. All other communications infrastructure is similarly basic. This means 
newspapers arrive out of date, if at all, television reception and the internet is almost 
non-existent and those with radios can generally pick up only state-run AM radio 
stations. The result is a serious mainstream media divide between Tongatapu and 
almost all of the other islands except Neiafu in Vava’u. This means that outside of 
Tongatapu, face-to-face communication remains the dominant method of exchanging 
information and new ideas – not newspapers, television, radio or the internet.  
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Ownership 
During research for this thesis it became apparent that engendering a sense of 
ownership among target communities was crucial for the long-term success or 
sustainability of participatory projects. Numerous authors have come to similar 
conclusions on the importance of ownership including Clarke, 2009; Chambers, 2005; 
Huesca, 2003; Gumucio-Dagron , 2009; and Cornish & Dunn, 2009. Creating that 
ownership, or buy-in, was achieved by establishing a respectful dialogue with the 
whole community from the outset. As already stated, face-to-face dialogue is by far 
the most effective communication tool in Tongan society, even in the relatively 
sophisticated media environment existing on Tongatapu. Across the island nation, 
NGOs utilize established community leaders (Town Officers) and forums (monthly 
community fono and more recently, kava clubs) to initiate that face-to-face dialogue. 
These approaches emphasise horizontal communication, rather than top-down 
interactions that are the hallmark of participation (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009; Cornish 
and Dunn, 2009; Bessette, 2006). Encouraging communities to draw up their own 
development priorities, nominate specific projects and elect their own leadership are 
some of the mechanisms through which horizontal dialogue is achieved. Importantly, 
these ideas and opinions are treated with respect and taken seriously by NGOs. 
Encouraged, community members develop a genuine enthusiasm for the development 
process and take ownership of it. Where this sense of ownership is not achieved, 
projects either fail outright or prove to be unsustainable (Soane Patolo interview 
2010).  
Examples of where poor communication resulted in unsustainable or failed projects 
were numerous in Tonga. I have already detailed development projects on the island 
Hunga that fall into this category: the water tanks provided by the Canada Fund, solar 
electricity panels supplied by Japanese donors and the EU-built health clinic. Other 
examples pointed out by NGOs included several jetties built for remote island 
communities that were quickly washed away by storms because donors failed to 
consult with locals about the best site to build these structures (Soane Patolo interview 
2010).  
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Town Officer 
Broaching those initial contacts and establishing face-to-face dialogue with 
communities hinges in large part upon the attitude of the Town Officer. Since the 
1960s, every Tongan community has elected one of its own to be their central 
government representative21. The Town Officer can wield considerable influence over 
a community, its overall development and the success of development projects. 
According to NGOs and community members interviewed for this thesis, Town 
Officers have been known to use their elected position to advance themselves and 
their favoured cliques (Napa’a Halatanu interview 2010). This exacerbates inequities 
within communities and promotes community disengagement with the political 
process (such as it is). The level of Town Officer support was cited as the key factor 
in the long-term success of development projects initiated by MORDI Tonga – those 
communities that enjoyed only half-hearted Town Officer support were demonstrably 
less successful than those where the Town Officer played an actively supportive role. 
This was even more crucial where projects relied upon community participation 
(Soane Patolo interview 2010).  
The role of the Town Officer in Tonga demonstrates that often it is local government, 
rather than national, that has the biggest impact upon the day-to-day activities of a 
community, especially those in remote areas. This goes largely unrecognised in 
development and development communications literature, which seems preoccupied 
with the initiatives of central government.  
 
Kava clubs 
Kava clubs, or faikava, have developed spontaneously and organically across Tonga, 
and are prevalent even on the most remote islands. While they have existed for 
generations, more recently kava clubs have evolved to become something more than 
mere social organisations. In many communities kava clubs have become an 
organisational focal point, initiating community development projects and fundraising 
to achieve those goals. Kava clubs, especially on the main island of Tongatapu, have 
evolved into well-organised and often wealthy establishments. Following the Tongan 
diaspora, affiliate clubs have also been established overseas in New Zealand, 
                                                
21 According to James (1997), there were 151 Town Officers in 23 districts. 
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Australia and the US. These clubs fundraise for their ‘home’ clubs giving some 
considerable economic clout.  
There seems little academic research or other literature available on the contemporary 
role of kava clubs, but my own observations confirmed that faikava have become an 
important forum for community discussion and action. Politicians and NGOs have 
also been quick to recognise the importance of kava clubs and have used them as a 
vehicle for promoting their own messages. The Women and Children Crisis Centre 
actively uses kava clubs to promote its non-violence message (interview 2010), while 
other NGOs confirm they use the forums in a more ad-hoc manner. Pro-democracy 
politicians and activists have also used faikava to spread their message (James, 2003).  
It is my assessment that faikava have assumed the role of community forum because 
they allow the expression of a more egalitarian outlook. This is in contrast with more 
traditional institutions, such as the Church or local and national government, which 
remain mired in the traditions of hierarchy and faka’apa’apa (respect). The less 
traditional outlook reflected by faikava has gathered strength over the past 30 to 40 
years in parallel with similar developments, like calls for greater democracy. The 
genesis of these trends can be traced to an educated elite (James, 2003) and the 
experience of expatriate Tongans living and working in New Zealand, Australia and 
the US. Of course, there are also the effects of greater access that nearly all Tongans 
now have had to foreign culture via television, movies and travel.  
The egalitarian ethos demonstrated by kava clubs only goes so far, however. It 
remains a strictly male domain, which is something NGOs wishing to take advantage 
of these forums ought to be mindful of. That should not preclude kava clubs from 
being considered an important communication tool for NGOs working in Tonga. 
Plainly, however, they are just part of the communications mix and would not be 
suitable for development messages directed specifically at women or children. For 
those messages, women’s weaving and craft groups should be considered. While not 
as visible as kava clubs, these groups are also prevalent throughout Tonga and 
provide an opportunity for NGOs to access large gatherings of community women.  
Tonga’s kava clubs and women’s craft groups are examples of local, participatory 
organisations that have evolved spontaneously to fulfil local needs. These have not 
arisen through the interventions of development agencies or through government 
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initiatives. They are truly grassroots organisations involved in community 
development. Of course, the impact of these organisations varies dramatically from 
community to community, but they seem more effective than most traditional, 
hierarchical institutions, such as nobles, the Church and government. More 
importantly for development agencies, they embody many of the attributes those 
organisations strive to create – both are participatory, community owned, empowering 
and sustainable.   
 
The Church 
NGOs and community members interviewed for this thesis said very little about the 
Church in relation to development, despite the fact that this institution so obviously 
remains hugely important in Tongan society. The main four denominations – 
Methodist, Mormon, Catholic and Free Church of Tonga – are present in nearly all 
communities, often occupying the largest and grandest buildings in each. The 
communities seem to be the primary funders of these buildings. However, none of the 
main churches seem to be closely involved in funding community-level development 
and no NGO cited the Church as an active partner in projects. In fact, the Church was 
only directly referred to as a conservative force that had to be placated, especially 
where it concerned projects with a moral dimension, such as sexual health and 
HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns (‘Ofakilevuka Guttenbeil-Likiliki, Vanessa Lolohea 
interviews 2010). That is not to dismiss the efforts of NGOs with religious affiliations 
that work in Tonga (the New Zealand Salvation Army, for example, has a strong 
presence on Tongatapu), nor to imply that Tongan churches are completely absent 
from development efforts (TCDT community facilitator Alaipuke Esau stated that the 
TCDT does work with churches). However, these denominations do not visibly lead 
efforts to develop their parishioner communities in the way that Liberation Theology 
clergy have done in Latin America. Appropriately, given that Liberation Theology is 
most closely associated with Catholicism, the only reference to a Tongan church 
leader taking an active role in promoting change was Bishop Patelisio Finau in the 
late 1980s. Field (2010) quoted Finau in 1989 declaring that Tonga’s elite had 
enslaved its commoners and created a climate of fear. The response from King 
Taufa’ahau Tupou IV was to label the Bishop a Marxist, while the Crown Prince 
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Tupouto’a later suggested he was the representative of a foreign power (p 65). Finau 
died of a heart attack in 1993.  
It is my contention that failure of such a central Tongan institution to take leadership 
in promoting material and social improvement of Tongan communities is a major 
abdication of responsibility. Before arriving in Tonga, I was expecting to witness a 
society that was devoutly religious across all strata – rich, poor, young and old. This 
was largely the case. What did surprise was the level of cynicism levelled at the 
Church by a minority of mostly young Tongans. This was not so much 
disillusionment with the institution, but with its leaders, who were often seen as self-
serving and greedy. This attitude was echoed even more strongly among Tongans 
(and Pacific Islanders generally) I have met living in New Zealand. If this is a 
growing trend, I suggest it will eventually create a crisis of legitimacy for the Church 
and an institutional vacuum within Tonga.   
This vacuum will be exacerbated by other existing trends; the declining influence of 
nobles (James, 1997) and a perception that central and local government has 
abandoned communities (Pesi Fonua 1992, cited by James, 1997). This void will have 
to be filled and to some extent already is by NGOs. But of far more importance, I 
suggest it is grassroots community organisations such as kava clubs and women’s 
craft groups that will step into the breach.  
At this point I should acknowledge that my perceptions of the Church are 
undoubtedly coloured by my own secular upbringing and atheism. It is also true that I 
did not question all interviewees closely on Church involvement and without speaking 
or reading Tongan, could easily have missed evidence of their input. However, I think 
it significant that no one interviewed about development activities they were involved 
with discussed the Church except in an oblique way. If the Church does play a 
significant role in development, it is reasonable to assume that interviewees would 
have raised this.  
Similarly, my assessment that kava clubs are (relatively) egalitarian cannot be 
separated from my own experience. While I did attend a kava club evening, I could 
not understand what was being discussed and my presence – the only palagi, or 
European, in the community – no doubt the meant the dynamic was changed to  
some extent.  
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Finally, while I was provided access to women’s weaving groups and other primarily 
female organisations, it was impossible to be completely free of gender-specific 
behaviour prescribed by an essentially patriarchal tradition (‘Ofakilevuka Guttenbeil-
Likiliki interview 2010). Politically, Tongan women are under-represented, especially 
in parliament. According to Guttenbeil-Likiliki (2006), since women received the 
vote in 1951, only four have been elected People’s Representatives in the Legislative 
Assembly. Decision-making at both national and local levels, therefore, remains 
largely the preserve of men – women cannot inherit land (The Human Rights Brief, 
2009) and violence against women remains a significant problem.22 This can only 
limit the depth of my assessment of women’s (and by extension, children’s) issues.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I believe that development agencies considering initiatives within the 
Kingdom of Tonga should carefully consider tailoring their communication strategies 
to best fit the local culture and infrastructure. Even for those initiatives that are not 
predominantly participatory in nature, it is important that agencies do not rely solely 
upon mainstream media to communicate with recipients. To achieve the best coverage 
and ensure the best understanding, agencies should make use of existing forums that 
rely on face-to-face communication – monthly community fonos, kava clubs and 
women’s craft groups. They must also enlist the co-operation of Town Officers in 
each community where they intend to work. Without gaining his support as a first step 
of an initiative, the overall success of the activity will be seriously compromised. 
Both of these points are just as valid for the relatively developed islands of Tongatapu 
and Vava’u, as they are for remote islands.   
Finally, I believe this research highlights areas that are richly deserving of further 
study. The first is kava and women’s craft clubs, and their activities, spread and 
influence. These are unique community phenomena that are not only examples of 
grassroots organisations evolving spontaneously and without outside intervention, 
they are also forums that development agencies might harness to their advantage.  
                                                
22 Recent official efforts to combat domestic violence included the creation of the police Tongan 
Domestic Violence Unit in 2007.  
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Secondly, I believe that attitudes towards the Church in Tonga are changing, 
especially towards the big four denominations, and that these institutions no longer 
enjoy the support they once did. This is largely speculation on my part, and plainly 
Tonga on the whole remains a devout nation. However, as globalisation becomes 
more entrenched and new ideas take hold, it seems reasonable to assume that a global 
trend of diminishing church attendance will also be felt in Tonga. 
Again, this has implications for development agencies wishing to work in the country. 
If, as I suspect, traditional Church influence is declining, partnering with those 
organisations may be counterproductive if development initiatives are identified with 
a discredited institution. Conversely, those issues that were once met by strong 
opposition from the Church may now receive a more open hearing from the Tongan 
public. Lastly, Tongan churches may also decide that they need to reverse public 
cynicism about their role, and take more of a lead in community development. This 
may see Churches be more willing to partner with development agencies.  
Despite its veneer of traditionalism and social (if not political) stability, Tongan 
society appears to be changing rapidly – new ideas, leaders and institutions are 
appearing as the old lose legitimacy and are increasingly challenged by new 
generations of Tongans. Effective development communication (and development 
agencies) will reflect these changes, choosing to work with new, community 
organisations. This type of development is thus contributing to change, rather than 
shoring up the old, increasingly discredited institutions (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). 
In the process, they are linking forms of development (e.g. MORDI) to wider 
processes of socio-political transformation. They are moving with the times (and the 
people), not trying to recreate conditions (real or imagined) from the First World. 
 
END 
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Interview Information sheet. 
Researcher: Ken Lewis. Master of Development Studies student. School of Geography, 
Environment and Earth Sciences. Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Email: 
lewiskenn@myvuw.ac.nz 
 
Academic Supervisor: Professor John Overton. Email: john.overton@vuw.ac.nz.  
Phone +64 4 463 5337 
            
I am a Masters student from Victoria University in New Zealand, working on a Masters thesis 
to be published early in 2011.  
I am researching the way in which development projects in Tonga have been promoted and 
explained to the Tongan people. I want to find out which communication approaches work 
best. It is my hope this information will help development agencies and the Government to 
better inform and include the Tongan people in future development projects. 
The University has provided ethics approval for this research on condition that consent is 
obtained from each person I interview.  
I am interviewing people about development projects they are familiar with. Participation in 
this research is voluntary and will be conducted in person. It should take no more than 60 
minutes. (An interpreter will be supplied if required). 
During the interview, I hope you will share your personal and professional views, feelings, 
ideas, and recommendations on how development projects are, and can be, communicated to 
the Tongan people. 
The interview will cover:   
• Your thoughts on a development project that you are familiar with.  
• Your involvement with that project.  
• How you were told about the project and what information was provided on its aims, 
timelines, purpose and the people it would effect.  
• Your ideas on what could be done differently in future.  
Before we start the interview you will be asked to sign a Consent Form. This is because what 
you tell me may be published in the resulting research thesis and deposited with the 
University Library. It may also be used in academic or professional journals. Your 
information or views will not be passed directly to any other private or government agency.  
If you agree to participate, your views may 
– be attributed to you personally and the organisation you represent, should you agree to 
that (see Consent Form)  
– be attributed only to the organisation you represent (see Consent Form) 
– only be attributed to you (see Consent Form) 
– remain completely confidential (see Consent Form) 
You can withdraw any information you have provided by 31 November 2010 by: 
• emailing: lewiskenn@myvuw.ac.nz 
The information you provide will be stored securely and only be accessed by Ken Lewis, an 
interpreter (if required) and the Academic Supervisor (named above). The information will be 
held for up to two years and then destroyed.  
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I am happy to provide a summary of the research results when it is completed. Please tell 
me how to best to get these to you when you sign the consent form.  
  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. Your responses will be a valuable 
contribution towards this research. 
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Consent Form 
 
I have read or had the information sheet explained to me. I understand the purpose of this 
research project is to investigate communication methods used in development projects 
undertaken in Tonga.    
 
Please tick as appropriate:  
 
• I consent to my name being used when my comments or opinions are used in this 
research (see waiver of confidentiality).   
 
• I request my name to be omitted.  
  
Organisation name:  
• I consent to the name of the organisation I work for being used in this research (see 
waiver of confidentiality).  
 
• I request the name of the organisation I work for to be omitted.  
 
Complete confidentiality: 
• I do not want any details that could identify me to be used.  
 
I understand the interview may be electronically recorded and that any notes or recorded 
material from interviews will be destroyed after 2 years of the research process being 
completed.  
  
I understand all information I provide will be kept confidential and accessed only by the 
researcher, interpreter (if required) and the Academic Supervisor.  
  
I understand I may withdraw myself and any information I have provided from the project 
without explanation by contacting Ken Lewis directly by 31 November 2010.  
  
I understand the results of this research will be included in a thesis and may be used for 
publication in academic or professional journals.   
  
I, (name) ___________________________________________________ from  
 
(organisation) _______________________________________________  have agreed to be 
interviewed by Ken Lewis as part of his Masters research project.    
  
Signed: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Date: ________________________________ 
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Interpreter Statement of Non-Disclosure 
 
 
I , 
(name)_____________________________________________________________________,  
have agreed to work with Ken Lewis as an interpreter during his Masters research project in 
Tonga.  
I understand that confidentiality is important to everyone taking part and I promise I will not 
discuss what has been said in any of the interviews I have been an interpreter for.   
 
I also promise that I will not reveal the names or identities of the participants to anyone.  
  
Signature: __________________________________________________               
  
  
Date: ___________________________________                
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